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The Myth of "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism":
Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era
by DAVID N. MAYER*
Introduction
No period in American constitutional history is as misunderstood as the
so-called "era of laissez-faire constitutionalism," also known as the "Lochner
era," for its best-known U.S. Supreme Court decision.' For forty years, from
18972 until 1937, 3 the Supreme Court used the due process clauses of the
* Professor of Law and History, Capital University, Columbus, Ohio. Copyright © David
N. Mayer.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court held unconstitutional a
New York statute prohibiting bakery employees from working more than ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week. The majority of the Court considered the statute to abridge "the right of contract"
between employer and employee, which was "part of the liberty of the individual" protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 53. Although Lochner is the best-known
Supreme Court decision from this era, it is not necessarily the case that best epitomizes the Court's
jurisprudence. As noted in Part II.A., infra, that distinction more properly pertains to Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), which not only was arguably the best-reasoned liberty-of-
contract decision but also the decision for which its reversal in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), signaled the end of the era.
2. The Supreme Court's decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), generally has
been regarded as the beginning of the Court's protection of liberty of contract under the due process
clauses of the Constitution. In its unanimous decision, the Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana
statute that prohibited marine insurance sales by companies not licensed to do business in that state.
Although this Article focuses on the United States Supreme Court's protection of liberty of contract, it
should be noted that state courts first began protecting the right under the due process clauses of state
constitutions and even under the Fourteenth Amendment several years before the Court did so. See
the discussion at the end of Part I.A., infra.
3. The West Coast Hotel decision in 1937 marked the so-called "New Deal Revolution,"
which, among other things, involved the Court's repudiation of its liberty-of-contract jurisprudence.
As noted in Part 1II, infra, it is convenient and appropriate to regard 1937 as the watershed year for the
transformation of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence even though important
developments occurred both before and after the West Coast Hotel decision.
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, applied substantively,4  to hold
unconstitutional various state and federal laws that abridged the right to
"liberty of contract." 5  Traditionally, the Lochner decision has been
condemned as an egregious instance of judicial activism; 6 and the Lochner era
generally has been seen as a time when American judges, motivated by the
desire to further the interests of rich capitalists, perverted the original meaning
of the due process clauses in order to engraft a laissez-faire ideology-
commonly caricatured as synonymous with the doctrines of "Social
Darwinism"--upon the Constitution.7  This traditional view so dominates
modem scholarship that it has become the orthodoxy of constitutional law
4. Liberty of contract is one form of substantive due process protection of liberty. A
convenient rule of thumb to identify a "liberty of contract" case-and the definition adopted in this
Article-is that it involved use of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to provide
substantive limits on legislation curtailing the freedom of persons to enter into lawful contracts of all
types. The doctrine of liberty of contract generally held that the freedom of individuals capable of
entering into a contract and giving consent to its terms could not be curtailed by government except
for "reasonable" legislation narrowly tailored to protect the public health, safety, or morals. See
generally THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 195, 237-39
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) (Peter Charles Hoffer's essays on "Contract, Freedom of," and "Due
Process, Substantive").
5. Although the term "liberty of contract" might be used interchangeably with "freedom of
contract" in popular political discourse and some scholarly writing, see generally HARRY N.
SCHEIBER, THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998), the term as
used in this Article uses the word liberty with particular reference to the constitutional concept. The
classic definition of liberty of contract was given by Justice Rufus Peckham in his opinion for the
Court in Allgeyer, discussed in Part I.C., infra. Although usually characterized as "economic"
substantive due process, liberty of contract had important non-economic liberty aspects as well, as
shown in Part I.B., infra.
6. See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning
and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 295 (1985) ("Nothing can
so damn a decision as to compare it to Lochner and its ilk."); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980) (Lochner "is one of the most condemned cases in
United States history and has been used to symbolize judicial dereliction and abuse."); Aviam Soifer,
The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court,
1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 250 (1987) (Lochner "is still shorthand in constitutional law
for the worst sins of subjective judicial activism."); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW:
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 124-25 (1988) ("We speak of 'lochnerizing' when we wish
to imply that judges substitute their policy preferences for those of the legislature.").
7. For classic examples of this view of laissez-faire constitutionalism, see generally CLYDE E.
JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER
G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954); ARNOLD M.
PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895
(1960); BENJAMIN TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAME TO THE
SUPREME COURT (1942). A modem variant of the traditional view considers the Lochner era as one
in which the Court protected a supposed laissez-faire system of "common law" rights against
redistributive legislation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
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casebooks,8 constitutional and legal history textbooks, 9 constitutional
commentaries written by both conservatives and liberals,' ° and even opinions
written by Supreme Court justices themselves."l
The modem orthodox view originated in legal scholarship written during
the so-called "Progressive" era in the early twentieth century.12 Progressive-
era scholars and jurists such as Roscoe Pound,13 Learned Hand,' 4 and Charles
8. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (5th ed. 2005)
(describing scholars' "substantive" objection to Lochner as an instance of the Court having "attempted
to vindicate, as a matter of constitutional law, a laissez-faire conception of the role of government that
could not be sustained"); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 292 (9th ed. 2001) (summarizing the Lochner era as one in which the Court "frequently
substituted its judgment for that of Congress and state legislatures on the wisdom of economic
regulation"). The authors of another casebook more blatantly reveal their own biases in criticizing the
Lochner era as "a rather dreary one in the Court's history" in which backward-looking judges used the
Fourteenth Amendment as "a shield for businesses." DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 18 (2d
ed. 1998).
9. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986, 45 (1990) ("liberty of contract found its way into the Constitution by bald
fiat"); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 190, 222 (1989)
(describing laissez-faire constitutionalism as a combination of "Social Darwinist" laissez-faire
ideology and legal formalism empowering "reactionary" appellate judges); MELVIN I. UROFSKY &
PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
509 (2d ed. 2002) (summarizing the traditional view of Lochner era judges as "intellectual prisoners,
held captive by the doctrines of laissez-faire and the inverted logic of legal formalism").
10. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 46 (1990) (criticizing both
Allgeyer and Lochner as "unjustifiable assumptions of power" by the judiciary); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 169 (1985) (maintaining that the demise of Lochner coincided with
"judicial acceptance of positivist approaches to property and contract rights"). As is typical of modem
judicial restraint conservatives, Bork rejects substantive due process altogether as inconsistent with
"neutral" judicial decision making; Tribe, on the other hand, accepts substantive due process
protection of certain non-economic liberty interests, such as the right to privacy. Compare BORK,
supra, at 43, with TRIBE, supra, at 12-13.
11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (characterizing the Lochner
era as one when the Court sat "as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions"); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (maintaining that the Court's protection of
contractual freedom "rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a
relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare").
12. Progressivism may be described as a reform movement of the early decades of the twentieth
century involving a diverse coalition of Americans who shared the conviction that government at all
levels should play an active role in regulating economic and social life. For the classic treatment of
Progressivism in the history of American political thought, see RICHARD A. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE
OF REFORM (1955). The Progressive movement and its conflict with the classical-liberal or laissez-
faire philosophy in early twentieth-century public policy debates are discussed in Part I.B., infra.
13. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457 (1909) (criticizing judicial
protection of freedom of contract as the result of an "individualistic conception ofjustice, which...
exaggerates private right at the expense of public right").
219
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Warren 15 were not neutral in their analysis of liberty of contract; rather, as
supporters of the Progressive movement, they were hostile to the individualist
philosophy that they perceived in the courts' protection of liberty of contract
and their personal hostility to the philosophy colored their criticism of the
jurisprudence. 16  Modem scholars who interpret Lochner by relying on the
views of such partisans as Pound, Hand, or Warren have made the same kind
of mistake that future historians would make in, say, relying on the views of
the National Right to Life organization to interpret Roe v. Wade.'
7
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner also has
contributed to the orthodox view of liberty of contract as laissez-faire
constitutionalism. His characterization of the majority's opinion as having
been "decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain"'18 has been accepted unquestioningly by historians and
constitutional scholars. 19 So pervasive has been the influence of Holmes's
characterization of the Lochner majority, with its criticism of the majority's
14. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARv. L. REV. 495,
501-03 (1908) (defending an eight-hour law as within the discretion of the legislature to "make more
equal the relative economic advantages of the two parties" to the labor contact, and to "promote the
'welfare' of the public").
15. See Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 462 (1926) (warning that the term "liberty" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause and "newly defined" by the Court, in its liberty-of-contract decisions, would "become
a tremendous engine for attack on State legislation").
16. Learned Hand, for example, was "a major... figure" and "a true believer" in the
Progressive movement. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 190
(1994). Hand's efforts on behalf of the movement included helping his good friend Herbert Croly
plan The New Republic magazine and advising Teddy Roosevelt on antitrust policy and on the "social
and industrial" planks of his 1912 platform. Id. at 191-202, 226-27. Indeed, as an advocate of
maximum hours, minimum wages, and workers' compensation legislation, Hand was especially
critical of judicial decisions invalidating such legislation; he even suggested total repeal of the due
process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to strip the courts of their power to
protect liberty of contract. Id. at 209, 249.
17. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court expanded the constitutional right
to privacy to include abortion under certain circumstances. Roe is probably the most controversial
Court decision of the last half of the twentieth century-and, like many of the decisions in the
Lochner era--it has ignited controversy between partisans with firmly held beliefs on both sides.
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTz, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 202 (1993)
(maintaining that Justice Holmes was "surely correct" in his characterization of Justice Peckham's
opinion for the Lochner majority); UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 9, at 559 (noting that Holmes
"showed up Peckham and the majority for doing just what they claimed not to be doing-writing their
personal preferences into law"). But see 2 DAVID O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
257-58 (2d ed. 1995) (acknowledging that Justice Harlan's dissent provided a "rival interpretation"
critiquing the majority for faling to construe New York's law as a legitimate public health measure).
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alleged judicial activism, 20 that many modem commentators forget that
Holmes was not condemning substantive due process per se. His declaration
that "[t]he word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion" has been so often
quoted out of context that scholars frequently have overlooked what Holmes
wrote in the rest of the sentence: "unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and the law.",21 Thus, even Holmes recognized that certain
"fundamental principles" might guide the courts in the exercise of their power
of judicial review.
2
The popularity of Justice Holmes's critique, as expressed in his Lochner
dissent, has perpetuated yet another aspect of the orthodox view of laissez-
faire constitutionalism: its association with legal formalism. According to the
orthodox view, judges protected liberty of contract by applying, rather
mechanically, formal rules of law that they regarded as objective and
scientifically discoverable. The great treatise writers of the late nineteenth
century-men such as Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and
John Forrest Dillon-provided a rationale, combining laissez-faire with legal
formalism, which "promoted an interventionist role for judges," who "treated
law as frozen, with its principles and values set and its rules determined for all
time. ' 23  In contrast to this formalist "declaratory jurisprudence," modem
scholars have identified a different theory of law which, by the early twentieth
century, had been embraced by the opponents of laissez-faire
constitutionalism: "sociological jurisprudence." As a leading constitutional
history textbook describes it, this was "a theory of law that its proponents
regarded as more realistic, democratic, and humane," viewing law as "not a
20. "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," Holmes
pithily noted, adding,
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is
made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76. As discussed in Part I.C., infra, however, Holmes's characterization of
the majority decision was unfair: Justice Peckham did not base the Court's decision on what Holmes
called the "shibboleth" of laissez-faire, id. at 75, but rather on traditional limits of the police power.
21. Id. at 76.
22. Many scholars also ignore the other dissenting opinion in Lochner (authored by Justice
Harlan and joined by Justices White and Day) that accepted liberty of contract as an important
constitutional right but which disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the New York law as a
violation of that right, as discussed in Part II, infra.
23. HALL, supra note 9, at 222-23.
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body of immutable principles and rules, but rather an institution shaped by
social pressures that was constantly changing., 24 Sociological jurisprudence
viewed the law essentially as Justice Holmes had described it in his 1881
book, The Common Law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.
25
Hence, under the orthodox view, judicial protection of laissez-faire
values has been seen as a product of formalist legal reasoning, shaped by
conservative "prejudices," and out of touch with the "realities" of modem
industrial society.26
In recent years, however, several scholars have challenged the orthodox,
neo-Holmesian view of the Lochner era, questioning a number of the
assumptions on which it has rested. In reassessing the Lochner era, some of
these revisionist scholars have traced the origins of liberty of contract to a
variety of sources in early American constitutional thought: among them, the
"original meaning" of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments;27 a hostility to "special" or "class"; 28 legislation deeply
24. ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 454 (7th ed. 1991). As the authors further note, by
the 1920s there emerged, out of sociological jurisprudence, "a more radical and reform-oriented
theory of law"--legal realism-that rejected altogether the idea of law as an objective set of rules and
embraced instead a view of law as "a kind of ad hoc method of arbitration." Id. at 455. For a
collection of classic Legal Realist writings of the 1920s and 1930s, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little,
Brown& Co. 1963) (1881).
26. See, e.g., Calvin Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to
the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286, 327 (1962) (arguing that the laissez-faire standard "has ceased to
comport with reality" in modem industrial society).
27. See Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453 (1985). Other
scholars representing a variety of jurisprudential perspectives--conservative, libertarian, as well as
liberal--have urged a revival of "natural law" in defense of substantive due process protection of
unenumerated constitutional rights, including (perhaps, but not necessarily) liberty of contract. See,
e.g., HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF
NATURAL RIGHTS (1994); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in
Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93 (1995); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the
States, 61 U. CiN. L. REv. 171 (1992).
28. See sources cited infra note 29.
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ingrained in Anglo-American law and political theory;29 and, the "free labor"
ideology of the antislavery movement and nineteenth-century Republican
party.30 Although the revisionist scholars disagree about the precise source of
the doctrine, they basically all agree that the orthodox view errs in
characterizing liberty of contract as, in the words of one scholar, "essentially
unprincipled or rooted in extraconstitutional policy preferences for laissez-
faire economics." 31 Rather, they argue, the doctrine was grounded in well-
established constitutional traditions.3 2  Other revisionist scholars have
challenged the orthodox view by questioning other assumptions on which it
rests: for example, that liberty of contract favored the economic interests of
employers and those who were "well-off," 33 that Lochner-era jurists were
"Social Darwinists," 34 or that laissez-faire constitutionalism was grounded in
29. See Benedict, supra note 6, at 293; HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); Alan Jones,
Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism ": A Reappraisal, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751
(1967).
30. See Eric Foner, Abolitionism and the Labor Movement in Antebellum America, in POLITICS
AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 57 (1980); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of
Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767; Charles W. McCurdy, The
Roots of Liberty of Contract Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937,
1984 SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y Y.B. 20.
31. GILLMAN, supra note 29, at 4. While acknowledging the contributions of scholars such as
Benedict, Jones, and McCurdy to his work, Gillman specifically disassociates his interpretation from
that of Siegan and other "conservative polemicists" interested in, as he characterizes it, "resurrecting
the ghost of Lochner by citing some incantation about the importance in our constitutional tradition of
rights to property and contract." Id. at 11.
32. See generally MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY:
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930s (2001) (concluding that the
conventional view of Lochner era substantive due process jurisprudence is based on several myths);
see also STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION (1994). In this provocative book,
which challenges modem constitutional law from a conservative perspective, Professor Presser
nevertheless disagrees with some fellow conservatives on the merits of the Lochner decision.
Conservative criticism of the Supreme Court's liberty of contracts jurisprudence "misses the mark,"
Presser argues, because Lochner was "solidly grounded in a specific and historically defined
American natural law tradition of the protection of private property." Id. at 142-43. Holmes's dissent
in Lochner "could not have been more wrong," Presser adds, noting that "the core" of the Founders'
philosophy of government was the protection of private property and contracts rights. Id. at 141-42.
33. See David E. Bernstein, Roots of the "Underclass": The Decline of Laissez-Faire
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 91 (1993) (arguing
that liberty of contract "often served to protect the most disadvantaged, disenfranchised workers from
monopolistic legislation sponsored by politically powerful discriminatory labor unions"); DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE
COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001) (maintaining that the ultimate failure of
Lochnerian jurisprudence-and, with it, the triumph of the post-New Deal regulatory state-not only
has strengthened racially exclusive labor unions but also has contributed to a massive loss in
employment opportunities for black persons).
34. See Bernstein, Roots of the Underclass, supra note 33, at 88 n.11 (noting scholarship
showing that "Social Darwinism actually had minimal influence on American laissez-faire liberal
a mechanical, or formalistic, jurisprudence.35 What emerges from this
revisionism is a more complex, and far more objective, picture of Lochner-era
constitutionalism, one which attempts more fully to take into account the
world view of the nineteenth century.
36
Synthesizing the new scholarship and presenting a coherent and
comprehensive overview of liberty-of-contract jurisprudence, this Article
argues that the orthodox view of the so-called Lochner era is fundamentally
flawed in a number of respects. Indeed, the Article argues that the orthodox
view is wrong in virtually all its assumptions, which were based on myths
originally propounded by Progressive era scholars and which have been
perpetuated by modem scholars.
The most important of these myths concerns the terminology scholars
have used to identify the jurisprudence of this era. Although generally
regarded as synonymous with liberty of contract, "laissez-faire
constitutionalism" is truly a misnomer. Judicial protection of liberty of
contract never involved doctrinal application of libertarian or laissez-faire
principles. Contrary to the orthodox, Holmesian view, judges did not read
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics or any other laissez-faire writing into the
Constitution. At most, what judges did in protecting liberty of contract was to
apply something like a general presumption in favor of liberty, a presumption
that could be rebutted by sufficient showing of reasonableness to justify a
given governmental regulation. Moreover, judges applied this presumption
quite inconsistently, in large part because the definition of "reasonable"
government regulation, and the definition of the proper scope of government's
police power on which it turned, was undergoing significant changes in the
early decades of the twentieth century. Rather than limiting it to protection of
public health, safety, or order, some scholars redefined the police power in
terms of the amorphous concept of "general welfare" to justify the activist
regulatory agenda of the Progressive movement.
When courts eventually abandoned their protection of liberty of contract
as a fundamental right-a watershed signaled by the so-called "New Deal
Revolution" of 1937-they did so because a sufficient number of judges had
thought, inside or outside legal circles"); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive
Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379, 418 (1988) (finding "painfIly little evidence that any members
of the Supreme Court were Social Darwinists, or for that matter even Darwinian").
35. See David N. Mayer, The Jurispndence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REv. 93, 99-100 (1990) [hereinafter Mayer, Tiedeman]
(arguing that Tiedeman, who was the purest laissez-faire legal treatise writer, grounded his
constitutionalism not in formalism but in the German sociological school ofjurisprudence).
36. For discussions of the shift in the "world view" of American intellectuals between the 1880s
and 1930s, see generally SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEz-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE (1956);
Woodard, supra note 26. Woodard describes the shift from the laissez-faire standard to the welfare
state standard as "one of the greatest intellectual and moral upheavals in western history." Id. at 288.
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adopted the Progressive activists' reformulation of the police power. Thus,
the orthodox Holmesian view has it almost precisely backwards. Rather than
focusing on pre-1937 decisions that allegedly read libertarian principles into
the Constitution, critics of judicial activism ought instead to focus on post-
1937 decisions in which judges unquestionably assumed the reasonableness
of "social legislation. 37  The majority of the Court did not read into the
Constitution Herbert Spencer's Social Statics or some similar laissez-faire
tract in Lochner, but the majority of the Court in effect did follow the
economic and legal theories of such proponents of social legislation as Henry
W. Famam and Ernst Freund 38 in the post-1937 cases upholding regulatory
laws under a minimal rational basis test.39  It is in the double standard of
modem constitutional law, under which economic liberty and property rights
are devalued compared to other favored liberty rights,4 ° that improper judicial
activism, which has been misleadingly branded "Lochnerism," truly can be
found.
Part I of the Article examines the jurisprudential foundations of liberty of
contract. The first section traces the roots of the doctrine to limitations on
government police powers that were well established in early American
constitutional law: the protection of economic liberty and property rights
through substantive due process or equivalent constitutional provisions. The
37. As used here, social legislation is a term of art, referring to a concept first introduced into
American law from Europe in the late nineteenth century but not recognized by the Supreme Court
until 1940. "The term came from Germany and there originated about the beginning of the [eighteen]
eighties... [and referred to] measures which are intended for the relief and elevation of the less
favored classes of the community," such as wage and hour regulations and other factory laws. Unlike,
for example, "legislation for the safety of passengers on railroads," social legislation did not fall
within the traditional scope of the police power to curtail liberty in the interests of public health,
safety, or order. Rather, as legislation intended for the "relief' or "elevation" of particular groups of
persons, presumed to be the "less favored classes of the community," such laws were by definition
unconstitutional under traditional standards. Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime
in American Law, in SCHEIBER, supra note 4, at 161, 162-63 (quoting ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS
OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 22 (1917)).
38. Famam was an economist, co-founder of the American Association for Labor Legislation
(AALL), and a life-long activist for minimum wage laws, social insurance programs, and other social
legislation. Id. at 188-89. Freund also was active in the AALL and was the author of an influential
1904 treatise advocating a broad "elastic" interpretation of the police power. Id. at 192-93; Mayer,
Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 146-48.
39. As noted in Part III.B., infra, the new majority on the Supreme Court who upheld social
legislation and other economic regulatory laws after the so-called "New Deal Revolution" did so by
accepting unquestioningly the assumptions on which these laws were based, as exemplified by Chief
Justice Hughes' majority opinion in West Coast Hotel.
40. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 132-34 (1992) (describing the double standard and its
institutionalization in modem constitutional law through the famous footnote 4 in United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (1938)). The Carolene Products decision and the rise of
the double standard are briefly discussed in Part III.B., infra.
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second section discusses the broader philosophical context in which liberty of
contract emerged by the late nineteenth century: the rise of contract law and
what it revealed about the significance of individualism in American society.
The third section examines two contrasting approaches by which a general
right to liberty, including liberty of contract, could be protected by the courts:
one is what Justice Holmes accused the majority of doing in Lochner; the
other is what the majority actually did in that case and in other liberty-of-
contract decisions. In other words, this section will describe what a true
"laissez-faire constitutionalism" would have been and what the courts would
have done in Lochner and other cases if they truly had read Herbert Spencer's
Law of Equal Freedom into the Constitution, a model radically different from
what the courts actually did in enforcing liberty of contract.
Part II surveys the Court's most important liberty of contract decisions,
discussing not only its familiar applications in protecting economic liberty, as
in cases like Lochner, but also some less familiar applications, including the
protection of privacy rights and the prohibition of Jim Crow segregation laws.
Finally, Part III discusses the demise of liberty of contract by the late
1930s, when the so-called "New Deal Revolution" transformed substantive
due process, replacing the general presumption in favor of liberty with a new
paradigm incorporating the modem double standard in rights protection. As
this part of the Article argues, the Court's liberty of contract jurisprudence did
not end as a result of political pressures in 1937 when the so-called "switch in
time that saved nine" occurred, a refeience to the justices' apparent shift
following Franklin Roosevelt's announced plan to "pack" the Court. Rather,
liberty of contract failed because of its weak jurisprudential foundations: it
was based on an ill-defined standard, a general rule riddled with exceptions,
under which the vast majority of challenged government regulations were
upheld by the courts. As shown here, the road from liberty of contract as it
was actually enforced in the courts-which was vastly different from the
laissez-faire constitutionalism stereotype-to the post-1937 minimal rational
basis test, was a short road indeed.
I. Jurisprudential Foundations of Liberty of Contract
In his famous Lochner dissent, Justice Holmes was both right and
wrong. He was right in criticizing the majority of justices of the Court for
being inconsistent in their protection of liberty of contract; for, as discussed
below, Lochner indeed was logically inconsistent with a number of the
Court's decisions upholding various laws which, in Holmes' words, "equally
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interfere" with liberty.41 Nevertheless, Holmes was wrong to suggest that the
majority used the Fourteenth Amendment to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics. ' ' 2 Contrary to Holmes' assertion, the majority of the Court in
Lochner-and in the other key liberty of contract decisions both before and
after Lochner--did not base its protection of liberty of contract on "an
economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain," still
less upon Herbert Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom, the "shibboleth" (in
Holmes' words) favoring "[t]he liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long
as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same.,
43
When Holmes cited Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, he was referring to
the best-known work written by the foremost English classical-liberal, or
laissez-faire, theorist of his time. As this reference to the work suggests,
Spencer's writings were familiar to American intellectuals but that does not
mean they were widely influential. Indeed, classical-liberal ideas were as
controversial at the turn of the last century as they are today, not only in
popular politics but also in legal culture. True laissez-faire constitutionalism
challenged established principles of Anglo-American common law and
nineteenth-century American constitutional law as much as did the new
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism advocated by so-called
"Progressive" reformers in the early twentieth century.
Rather than consistently protecting liberty through a true laissez-faire
constitutionalism, judicial protection of liberty of contract in the early
twentieth century adhered to traditional principles of nineteenth-century
constitutional law, including a traditional understanding of the scope of
state police power. In protecting liberty of contract as a right under the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court was
merely applying a general presumption in favor of liberty that could be
overridden by various exercises of the police power that the justices
considered legitimate. This conservative constitutionalism can easily be
confused with a laissez-faire constitutionalism by modern scholars because
both conservatives and laissez-faire theorists were opposed to the
expansion of the police power advocated by "Progressive" reformers (and
assumed to be reasonable by most modern scholars).
41. As shown in Part II.A., infra, however, that inconsistency can be explained by the
limited scope of the Court's protection of liberty of contract.
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. Id. For more on Herbert Spencer and his "Law of Equal Freedom," see the discussion infra
Part I.C. 1.
A. Constitutional Limits on the Police Power
Constitutional protection of individual liberty in all its aspects-
including economic liberty and the protection of property rights-did not
suddenly appear in American law in the late nineteenth century as a result of
classical-liberal, laissez-faire ideology. Rather, high regard for economic
liberty and property as fundamental rights of the individual was well
established in American constitutionalism quite early in the nation's history-
indeed, even predating the Constitution itself. As a preeminent legal historian
has noted, "Liberty was the most cherished right possessed by English-
speaking people in the eighteenth-century. ' '44  The Patriot leaders of the
Revolution, influenced profoundly by English radical Whig opposition
thought,45 made liberty even more essential by transforming it from not only
the most treasured right under law but also the touchstone for the legitimacy
of law itself.
46
The framers of the early state constitutions, written during the
Revolution, and the federal Constitution of 1787 included various provisions
protecting individual liberty, which included economic liberty and property
rights. Typical provisions of the early state constitutions explicitly recognized
liberty rights, property rights, and the rights to both life and the pursuit of
happiness, which were considered natural and "inherent" rights that all
individuals possessed as human beings.47
44. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1 (1988).
45. On English radical Whig thought and its influence on American constitutionalism, see David
N. Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 131
(1992) [hereinafter Mayer, Whigs].
46. Americans in the founding period saw liberty as something more than merely freedom to do
what the law permitted: they followed English radical Whig philosophers of government in
identifying liberty with natural freedom, i.e., the freedom of individuals to do what they will, provided
they do not violate the equal right of others. Id. at 191 (summarizing state of nature as described in
John Locke's Second Treatise on Government and other Whig writers). Constitutionally speaking,
what was truly radical about the American Revolution was that it made the protection of individual
rights (including both liberty in this broader sense and property rights) the test for government's
legitimacy. See id. at 193.
47. For example, the bill of rights for the Virginia constitution noted "all men are by nature
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights... namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety." Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. 1 (1776), in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1971). Virtually identical provisions can be
found in other Revolutionary-era constitutions, including those of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire. A leading scholar of the early state constitutions has concluded from such
provisions that "the acquisition of property and the pursuit of happiness were so closely connected
with each other in the minds of the founding generation that naming only one of the two sufficed to
evoke both. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY
AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 193 (1980).
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Although other constitutional provisions gave important protections to
liberty and property rights,48 the most significant general guarantee of liberty
and property rights were the due process, or "law of the land," provisions of
the state and federal constitutions. The due process clauses of the federal and
state constitutions have perhaps the longest pedigree of any American
constitutional provision, for they can be traced directly back to the famous
clause thirty-nine of the Magna Carta: "No freeman shall be captured or
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor
will we go against him or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land.' 49 The "law of the land" over time became
synonymous with due process of law, and the early state constitutions
typically contained law-of-the-land clauses in lieu of due process clauses.5°
Contrary to the assertions of some modem scholars that substantive due
process did not originate until the middle of the nineteenth century, with the
Dred Scott case, 51 American courts in fact began applying the doctrine of
substantive due process not long after adoption of the Constitution itself. It
also should be noted that only modem scholars have drawn the distinction
48. Among the most important of these other provisions were the takings clauses and ex
post facto clauses of both state and federal constitutions and the provision in Article I, Section 10
of the U.S. Constitution prohibiting states from passing laws impairing the obligation of
contracts.
49. Magna Carta, cl. 39, in I SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 115, 121 (Carl
Stephenson & Frederick George Marcham eds., rev. ed. 1972) (1215).
50. E.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. 8 (1776) ("that no man be deprived of his liberty
except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers"); Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, sec.
IX (1776) ("nor can any man be justly deprived of his liberty except by the laws of the land, or the
judgment of his peers"); Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, sec. XII (1780) ("no subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his liberty, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate; but by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land."), in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 47, at
235, 265, 342. In the period before the U.S. Constitution was adopted, six states plus Vermont (which
governed itself as an independent republic before being admitted to the Union in 1791) adopted bills
of rights as parts of their constitutional documents; each of these bills of rights contained a law of the
land provision. In addition, two states inserted a law of the land clause in the body of their
constitutions rather than in a separate bill of rights. For a discussion of these state constitutional
provisions, see Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 974-75.
51. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 10, at 32; RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 193-95, 204 n.36 (1977). The claim that due
process-and specifically, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-was limited to
procedural requirements may have originated with Justice Miller's opinion for the majority of the
Supreme Court in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877) (complaining that "the docket of
this court is crowded with cases" challenging state laws under "some strange misconception" of the
scope of due process). See A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 363-64 (1968). Miller's analysis in this case, like his opinion for
the Court in The Slaughterhouse Cases, reflected the majority's desire to narrow the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment to minimize federal review of state laws, as discussed infra.
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between "procedural" and "substantive" due process. The phrase substantive
dueprocess is anachronistic: it has no known use before the early 1930s52 and
has been used since that time as a pejorative oxymoron by opponents of
Lochner-era jurisprudence and, later, opponents of the Warren Court.53
Indeed, it can be argued that the concept of "due process of law" logically
entails both procedural and substantive elements and that the substantive
element in turn logically derives from the rights to life, liberty, and property
that the constitutional provisions protect.54
By the late eighteenth-century, state courts began to view law-of-the-
land clauses in state constitutions as restrictions on legislation--or, in other
words, as substantive protections for property rights.55 In a series of decisions
from the 1790s to the 1850s, the highest courts of several states held that the
law-of-the-land clause in their state constitutions prohibited the legislature
from passing laws which deprived citizens of their property.56 One of these
decisions, Wynehamer v. People,57 by the New York Court of Appeals in
1856, is particularly important. The court held that a statute outlawing the
sale of liquor was a deprivation of property without due process of law;
specifically, the liquor owned by tavern keepers when the law took effect.58
The court observed that "the legislature cannot totally annihilate commerce in
any species of property, and so condemn the property itself to extinction.
' 59
52. See G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes' Lochner Dissent, 63
BROOK. L. REv. 87,108 (1997); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in
the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 (1999).
53. See Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 244-45
(1999).
54. See Roger Pilon, Legislative Activism, Judicial Activism, and the Decline of Private
Sovereignty, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 183, 197-99 (James A. Dom & Henry G.
Manne eds. 1987). Pilon argues that "[w]hile procedural correctness is a necessary condition for due
process, it is not a sufficient condition," for due process of law also requires "substantive correctness."
Id. at 197. "Due process of law," he concludes, "is more than mere process; and it is more than
process plus any substance. It is process plus that substance that tells us when we may or may not
deprive a person of his life, liberty, or property." Id. at 199. Pilon gives a simple example: "We have
no right to hang a man simply because he is a Jew, even if a substantial majority of the legislature says
that we may." Id. Due process of law requires recognition of the principle that "no man may be
hanged unless he has done something to alienate his right against being hanged." Id. at 198-99.
55. ELY, supra note 40, at 78.
56. See generally Sherry, supra note 27, at 216-19; Riggs, supra note 50, at 980-81.
57. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 378 (1856).
58. See id. at 387.
59. Id. at 399. The Indiana Supreme Court a year earlier held that the state liquor prohibition
law was invalid under the natural-rights provision in the state constitution, as an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty. In his opinion for the court, Judge Perkins declared that "the right of liberty and
pursuing happiness secured by the constitution, embraces the right, in each compos mentis individual,
of selecting what he will eat and drink, in short, his beverages .... and that the legislature cannot take
away that right by direct enactment." Herman v. State, 8 hid. 545, 558 (1855). This was the one
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The decision not only was a striking instance of substantive use of due
process but also, as a leading modem scholar of property rights has observed,
was "the first time that a court determined that the concept of due process
prevented the legislature from regulating the beneficial enjoyment of property
in such a manner as to destroy its value."
60
In the same year as the Wynehamer decision, the United States Supreme
Court also adopted the view that the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment restricted Congress's powers. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land and Improvement Co., Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, writing for the Court,
found that the clause was "a restraint on the legislative as well as on the
executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed
as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its
mere will. '61 This decision anticipated the Court's controversial ruling a year
later, in the Dred Scott case, where Chief Justice Roger Taney interpreted the
due process clause as a substantive limitation on the power of Congress to
prohibit slavery in the territories.62 What made Dred Scott so controversial at
the time was not the Court's use of substantive due process; after all,
Republicans and antislavery activists had used substantive due process
arguments to reach an opposite result. 63 Rather, the Dred Scott decision was
decision conceded by Charles Warren, in his 1926 Harvard Law Review article, to be an exception to
his claim that in early American history, "liberty" meant only the freedom of the person from physical
restraint. Warren, supra note 15, at 444-45.
60. ELY, supra note 40, at 79. Citing Wynehamer among other decisions, Ely has observed,
"antebellum courts employed due process as a device to safeguard economic interests." James W.
Ely, Jr., Economic Due Process Revisited, 44 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 213, 220 & n.45 (1991) (reviewing
PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK
(1990)).
61. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856).
Ely observes that although Murray's Lessee turned on a procedural issue, the opinion "suggested a
larger measure of judicial authority that could easily provide a basis for substantive review of
congressional legislation." ELY, supra note 40, at 79.
62. Taney-writing on this issue for a majority of the Court comprised of himself and five other
justices-held that the 1820 Missouri Compromise law, which barred slavery from the northern part
of the territory added to the United States by the Louisiana Purchase, "could hardly be dignified with
the name of due process of law." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
63. A year before the Dred Scott decision, the platform of the newly created Republican Party
understood the Fifth Amendment to require the opposite of what Taney interpreted the Constitution to
require: focusing on the due process clause's protection of liberty, rather than property, Republicans
understood it to impose a "duty" on Congress to prohibit slavery from the territories. The
Antislavery Planks of the Republican National Platform (1856), in SOURCES 1N AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 99 (Michael Les Benedict ed. 1996). The 1860 Republican platform
repeated this plank and also, without referring directly to the Dred Scott decision, decried "the
new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force, carries Slavery" into the territories, calling the
idea "a dangerous political heresy" at odds with the Constitution itself. The Republican Party
Platform (May 16, 1860), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 9TH ED. 363, 364 (Henry
Steele Commager ed., 1973). Two anti-slavery third parties, the Liberty Party in its 1843
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controversial because of Taney's particular application of substantive due
64process, in what was arguably obiter dictum in the case, to resolve a hotly
65contested political question.
Following these precedents for substantive due process protection of
property and economic liberty rights, state courts began recognizing liberty of
contract in the years prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana.66 The New York Court of Appeals, in two important decisions
in the year 1885, interpreted the state constitution's due process clause to
protect both property and liberty rights, in a broad sense. In January 1885, in
In re Jacobs, the court found unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the
manufacture of cigars in tenement houses.67 Six months later, in its June 1885
decision in People v. Marx, the New York Court of Appeals found
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited the manufacture of oleomargarine, on
the grounds that it deprived oleomargarine manufacturers of their economic
freedom, as protected under both the state constitution and the Fourteenth
68Amendment. Ten years later, in a decision that could be regarded as the first
explicit protection of liberty of contract by an American court, the Illinois
platform and the Free Soil Party in its 1848 and 1852 platforms, also declared that the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause secured the inalienable rights enumerated in the Declaration of
Independence. See BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 71-72 (1987).
64. A seven-justice majority of the Dred Scott Court held that, under Missouri law, Dred
Scott was still a slave-arguably making irrelevant the holding on the Missouri Compromise
restriction. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
& POLITICS 324-25 (1978). "Obiter dictum" was "the Republican battle cry in the war upon the
Dred Scott decision." Id. at 439.
65. Abraham Lincoln, in his first inaugural address, emphasized third parties' use of Court
decisions "for political purposes" when, without specifically mentioning Dred Scott, he denied
the ability of the Supreme Court to determine for Congress or the president "the policy of the
government, upon vital questions affecting the whole people," by the Court's decisions "in
ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions." Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1861), in I DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 63, at 387.
66. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
67. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). Anticipating the broad definition of liberty that the
U.S. Supreme Court would adopt twelve years later in Allgeyer, the New York court held that
liberty "means the right not only of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment, or restraint, but the
right of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his
livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation." Id. at 106-07. The
court rejected the argument that the law was a legitimate exercise of the police power, as a health
measure, finding that it had "no relation whatever to the public health." Id. at 114. Rather, the court
found, "[u]nder the guise of promoting the public health," the legislature had "arbitrarily interfere[d]
with personal liberty and private property without due process of law." Id. at 115.
68. People v. Marx, 2 N.E. 29 (N.Y. 1885). The court rejected the state's rationale for the
statute as protecting consumers against fraudulent imitations of dairy butter and understood the
statute instead as a "dangerous" measure protecting the dairy industry from competition. Id. at
33-34. The court held that liberty, in the broad sense as it had defined it in Jacobs, was protected not
only by the due process clause of the state constitution but also by its "law of the land" clause, as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 33.
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Supreme Court in Ritchie v. People held unconstitutional a statute setting
maximum limits on the hours worked by women in factories. 69  The court
found that the statute exceeded the legitimate scope of the state's police power
by abridging the freedom of both the employer and employee "to contract
with each other in reference to the hours of labor." The court based this "right
to contract" on the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, finding it to
involve "both a liberty and property right.,
70
As these New York and Illinois cases suggest, state courts in the
nineteenth century understood the general regulatory power of the states
known as the "police power" to be broad but certainly not unlimited.7' Just as
state courts were willing to apply the due process clauses of state constitutions
substantively to protect liberty or property rights when legislatures exceeded
the legitimate scope of the police power, so too would the U.S. Supreme
Court use the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Although
the Court's concern for federalism explained its exceedingly narrow
69. Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 455 (Ill. 1895). The statute provided, "[N]o female shall
be employed in any factory or workshop more than eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in
any one week." Id.
70. Id. at 455-56. The court observed, "Labor is property, and the laborer has the same right
to sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as has any other property owner. In this
country the legislature has no power to prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own
contracts, nor can it interfere with the freedom of contract between the workman and the employer."
Id. Significantly, the court explicitly rejected sexual paternalism-the state's rationale that the
statute was a valid public health measure, "designed to protect woman on account of her sex and
physique"-the rationale accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court as justification for a maximum-
hours law applied to women in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Instead, it found that
women were sui juris and therefore "entitled to the same rights, under the constitution, to make
contracts with reference to [their] labor, as are secured thereby to men. Ritchie, 40 N.E. at 458.
71. Traditionally, the police power comprised the authority to protect public health, safety, and
morals. ELY, supra note 40, at 60. Thomas M. Cooley, author of Constitutional Limitations, the
most influential constitutional law treatise in the nineteenth century, defined the police power as the
"whole system of internal regulation" by which a state not only preserves public order but also
establishes "for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of the
rights by others. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 704 (6th ed. 1890).
A modem commentator has traced the origins of the police power to the English common law concept
that one ought to use one's property in such a way as not to injure that of another: sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas. Scott M. Reznick, Empiricism and the Principle of Conditions in the Evolution
of the Police Power: A Model for Definitional Scrutiny, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 4 (1978).
72. Section 1, the key substantive part of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant
part, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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interpretation of the amendment during the 1870s, 1880s, and early 1890S,
7 3
changes in the Court's membership by the late 1890s helped pave the way for
a more expansive interpretation of the amendment.74 Thus, the Court's new-
found willingness to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to limit states' exercise
of the police power came at the very time that the states were pushing its
exercise beyond its traditional scope.
B. A Society Based on Contract
Legal historians frequently have characterized the nineteenth century as
"the golden age of the law of contract" in American law.75 Yet contract law,
in its modem forn, was a relatively recent development; in the words of one
historian, it "began to take shape only in the eighteenth century, and the
73. The Court's concern for the traditional balance of state and federal powers was evident
in its infamous decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases, where Justice Miller explicitly voiced the
fears of the majority, that too broad an interpretation of the amendment "would constitute this court a
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens." The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873). For the next two decades, the Court
generally rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state laws-and thus refrained from
limiting the discretion of state legislatures in exercising police powers. See, e.g., Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (refusing to interfere with a state's determination that
women could not practice law); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding an Illinois law
setting maximum rates charged by grain elevators in Chicago, on the theory they were businesses
"affected with a public interest"); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a liquor
prohibition law as a valid use of the police power to protect public health and morals); Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding a ban on oleomargarine as a public health law). In
a series of cases during this period the Court also nearly unanimously held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply the federal Bill of Rights to the states. See United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1876) (finding that the First Amendment fight to assemble and the Second
Amendment fight to bear arms applied only against the national government); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (finding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
cases did not apply to the states); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (finding that the
Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment was not required by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
74. As one scholar has observed, by 1892 six of the Court's justices had concluded that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states; but, "[u]nfortunately, they did not sit
and reach their conclusions at the same time." MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 191 (1986). Among the new justices
appointed in the 1890s was Rufus W. Peckham, an 1895 nominee by President Grover Cleveland.
Peckham was also Clevaland's friend, a fellow New York Democrat, and would later write the
opinions for the Court in both Allgeyer and Lochner.
75. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 203 (3rd ed. 2005). Friedman
explains that, as "the body of law that pertained to the growing market economy," contract law "grew
up in the era when the last vestiges of feudalism vanished, and a capitalist order flourished." He adds,
"It became indispensable in the age of Adam Smith," and its domain steadily expanded in the
nineteenth century, when it "greedily swallowed up other parts of the law." For example, although
land law remained important, "land dealings were more and more treated contractually." Id.
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modem law of contract developed only in the nineteenth century."76 English
common law had been based on property and lacked a robust notion of
contract; contracts were regarded as "the handmaidens of property, a useful
means of transferring title from one person to another., 77  William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, first published in the
late 1760s, said little about contract, which it conceptualized as part of the
"rights of persons" based on special relationships. 78 It was at about the time
that Blackstone's Commentaries were first published, in the middle of the
eighteenth century, that "contract began to emerge from the shadow of
property"; and with the emergence of contract, there arose in Anglo-American
common law "a new way of thinking about legal relations, emphasizing
intention rather than possession, voluntarism rather than vestedness. 79
The emergence of contract law both in England and in America in the
latter eighteenth century coincided with a profound shift in the role of law
generally that was described in famous words by the great nineteenth-century
English legal historian, Sir Henry Maine: "The movement of progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.' '80  The
transition from a status-based society to a contract-based society has a dual
significance. First, with regard to the evolution of the rule of law, the
transition meant a movement away from a regime of special rules that single
out particular persons or groups toward general, abstract rules equally
applicable to all.8' Second, with regard to evolving concepts of individual
rights, the transition meant an expanded understanding of persons' rights to
76. John V. Orth, Contract and the Common Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
44 (Harry N. Scheiber ed. 1998).
77. Id. at 48-49.
78. Id. at 51. Orth further notes,
In the entire four-volume Commentaries, extending over two thousand printed pages,
labor law (such as it is) occupies ten pages in Book I, on the "rights of persons." A
chapter on "master and servant" leads off a series of chapters on what Blackstone calls
"the great relations in private life," including, in addition to the employment
relationship, familial relationships such as 'husband and wife' and 'parent and child'
and the substituted family of "guardian and ward."
Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *410).
79. Id. at 49.
80. SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Dorset Press 1986) (1861) (Eng.).
81. Recognizing this shift, Friedrich Hayek has suggested that Maitland's emphasis on
contract as the opposite of status may be a little misleading. Status means that each individual
occupies an assigned place in society; in law, it is reflected in legal rules which are "not fully
general but single out particular persons or groups and confer upon them special rights and
duties." The true contrast to such a legal regime, Hayek argues, is a system of "general and equal
laws, of the rules which are the same for all, or, we might say, of the rule of leges in the original
meaning of the Latin word for laws-leges that is, as opposed to the privi-leges." FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 154 (1960).
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liberty. Under the regime of contract, each person who is suijuris, that is,
legally competent to make a contract, becomes what the literal translation of
the Latin phrase means, "of one's own right," or a law unto oneself. Thus, in
the modem era, contract becomes, as one scholar aptly characterizes it, "the
most important of the instruments that the law supplies to the individual to
shape his own position."
82
American lawyers and judges, at the end of the nineteenth century,
frequently described contemporary American society as one based on
contract, in contrast to medieval society, which was based on status. They
also appreciated the significance of this shift for what it meant for individual
liberty. For example, the attorneys challenging a New York rate-fixing law in
1892 argued that the American constitutional tradition rejected "medieval
darkness, which permitted every detail of one's life to be regulated" and
instead embraced the "modem" doctrine of "freedom of action."83 And when
the New York Court of Appeals struck down the law prohibiting cigar
manufacturing in Jacobs, it expressed the fear that upholding the law would
reverse the progress society has made from the paternalism of the past:
Such legislation may invade one class of rights today and another
tomorrow, and if it can be sanctioned under the Constitution, while
far removed in time we will not be far away in practical
statesmanship from those ages when government prefects supervised
the building of houses, the rearing of cattle, the sowing of seed and
the reaping of grain, and governmental ordinances regulated the
movements and labor of artisans, the rate of wages, the price of food,
the diet and clothing of the people, and a large range of other affairs
long since in all civilized lands regarded as outside of government
functions 84
82, Id. The great legal historian J. Willard Hurst similarly emphasized individualism when
he described the nineteenth-century American legal order as one that sought to "protect and
promote the release of individual creative energy to the greatest extent compatible with the broad
sharing of opportunity for such expression." JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 6 (1956).
83, Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1892) (argument for plaintiffs in error).
Although the majority of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument in Budd, it
received a far more sympathetic response from the New York Court of Appeals when it decided to
strike down the law--the decision overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling. In his opinion for
New York's highest court, Judge Peckham declared that continued adherence to the old ideas and
practices of paternal government (like rate-fixing laws) would "wholly ignore the later and as I firmly
believe the more correct ideas which an increase of civilization and a filler knowledge of the
fundamental laws of political economy, and a truer conception of the proper functions of government
have given us at the present day." Richard Skolnik, Rufus Peckham, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1685, 1692-
93 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) (quoting from People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1 (1889)).
84. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 114-15 (1885).
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Classical-liberal, or "laissez-faire," theorists in the late nineteenth
century went even further, using the concept of contract-and the policy of
individualism that it implied-as virtually synonymous with progress. To
them, what made America "modem" was its use of contract, in this broad
sense. William Graham Sumner, perhaps the best known of the American
theorists of laissez-faire,85 in his classic work, What Social Classes Owe to
Each Other, identified the transition this way:
In the Middle Ages men were united by custom and prescription into
associations, ranks, guilds, and communities of various kinds. These
ties endured as long as life lasted. Consequently society was
dependent, throughout all its details, on status, and the tie, or bond,
was sentimental. In our modem state, and in the United States more
than anywhere else, the social structure is based on contract, and
status is of the least importance.
86
Sumner further described contract relationships as based, not on
"sentiment," but rather on "rational--even rationalistic" considerations; such
modem relationships are "not permanent" but endure "only so long as the
reason for [them] endures. 87 What resulted was individualism:
A society based on contract is a society of free and independent men,
who form ties without favor or obligation, and co-operate without
cringing or intrigue. A society based on contract, therefore, gives the
utmost room and chance for individual development, and for all the
self-reliance and dignity of a free man.
88
Sumner's notion of "a society based on contract" was somewhat
reminiscent of American society as it had been described in the early 1830s
by Alexis de Tocqueville, the young French aristocrat who in his classic book,
Democracy in America, had coined the term individualism to identify the
unique phenomenon he discerned during his travels in America.89 Rather than
85. Sumner has been regarded as the Herbert Spencer of the United States, "the American
champion of laissez faire," whose book, What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, was "a restatement
in the American vernacular of the great English classicists." RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, THE COURSE
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 231-32 (3d ed. 1986).
86. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER 22-23
(Caxton Printers 1986) (1883).
87. Id. at 24.
88. /d.at23.
89. Individualism, wrote Tocqueville, "disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the
mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends"; individualists "owe no
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being appalled at individualism, as Tocqueville was,90 however, Sumner
embraced it as the chief organizing principle of society. The son of a poor
English immigrant, Sumner had high regard for such middle-class virtues as
productiveness and prudence; he also appreciated the opportunities for
individuals to rise or to fall according to their own merit, in the post-Industrial
Revolution market society about which he wrote.9'
A free society, as Sumner understood it, was one in which each
individual is "sovereign," both free and equal, owing no political or legal
duties toward others except "respect, courtesy, and good will. '92 The duty of
respect-and especially respect for others' equal rights-was particularly
important to Sumner:
Rights should be equal, because they pertain to chances, and all
ought to have equal chances so far as chances are provided or limited
by the action of society .... We each owe it to the other to guarantee
mutually the chance to earn, to possess, to learn, to marry, etc., etc.,
against any interference which would prevent the exercise of those
rights by a person who wishes to prosecute and enjoy them in peace
for the pursuit of happiness. If we generalize this, it means that All-
of-us ought to guarantee rights to each of us.
93
man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody" and "imagine that their whole destiny is
in their own hands." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY tN AMERICA 506, 508 (J.P. Mayer
ed., 1969) (Part 1I, Chapter 2).
90. After reverently describing the importance of family connections in aristocratic
societies, Tocqueville, in contrast, decried the individualism prevalent in democratic societies as
"based on misguided judgment," in which "[e]ach man is forever thrown back on himself alone"
and thus "shut up in the solitude of his own heart." Id.
91. By hard work, wise management, and frugal living, Sumner's father was able to afford a
college education for his son. After serving first as a clergyman, Sumner moved to academics in 1872
and became professor of political economy at Yale. He was a pioneer in the emerging field of
sociology. GABRIEL, supra note 85, at 231-32.
92. SUvINER, supra note 86, at 33-34. In the final chapter of the book, entitled "Wherefore
We Should Love One Another," Sumner identified a moral duty of benevolence: because of their
"common participation in human frailty and folly," persons do owe "aid and sympathy" to one
other. Id. at 136-37. Nevertheless, emphasizing the political or legal duties of respect for others'
rights, he concluded that "we all owe to each other, good-will, mutual respect, and mutual
guarantees of liberty and security. Beyond this nothing can be affirmed as a duty of one group to
another in a free state. Id. at 145.
93. Id. at 141-42. This was Sumner's full answer to the question he raised in the book's
introduction: "What ought Some-of-us do for Others-of-us? or, What do social classes owe to
each other?" His short answer was that "the State" owes nothing to anybody "except peace,
order, and the guarantee of rights." Id. at 11. In arguing that rights pertain to "chances," he
emphasized that "[r]ights do not pertain to results"; they pertain "to the pursuit of happiness, not
to the possession of happiness," and they will produce "unequal results," and justly so because
results should be "proportioned to the merits of individuals." Id. at 141.
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"Civil liberty," in a free society, meant that "each man is guaranteed the
use of all his own powers exclusively for his own welfare"; moreover, "[a]ll
institutions are to be tested by the degree to which they guarantee liberty."
94
Equally important to Sumner was self responsibility, for he also stressed that
everyone has "one big duty" in society, "to take care of his or her own self,"
as well as his family, if he has dependents.95 From this vision of a free
society, Sumner arrived at "the old doctrine-Laissez-faire," which he
translated into "blunt English" as "Mind your own business. 96
The philosophy called "laissez-faire" 97 followed from a body of thought
known as liberalism and often called "classical liberalism," to distinguish it
from the term liberalism as used in modem American political thought.98
Classical liberalism, or libertarianism, has been described by one of its leading
twentieth-century exponents as "the great political and intellectual movement
that substituted free enterprise and the market economy for the precapitalistic
methods of production; constitutional representative government for the
absolutism of kings or oligarchies; and freedom of all individuals from
slavery, serfdom, and other forms of bondage." 99  A modem libertarian
scholar has identified libertarianism as a centuries-old political tradition that
emphasizes individual liberty and limited government and holds, among its
94. Id. at 30.
95. Id. at 98. Sumner emphasized self-responsibility because, as noted below, he was
especially critical of social reformers who did not "mind their own business" and instead sought
to take care of others-and to use the coercive powers of government to achieve their
paternalistic ends.
96. Id. at 104.
97. The phrase laissez-faire, which has become a famous libertarian rallying cry, legendarily
originated among a group of eighteenth-century French philosophers known as the Physiocrats
(named after the Greek words physis (nature) and kratos (rule)), who advocating freeing
economic markets from governmental control so that markets could be ordered by their own
"natural laws." When asked by Louis XV, "How can I help you," a group of merchants was said
to have responded with the Physiocratic argument, "Laissez-nousfaire, laissez-nous passer. Le
monde va de lui-m~me." ("Let us do, leave us alone. The world runs by itself."). DAVID BOAZ,
LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 38-39 (1997).
98. The term liberal underwent a change in the early twentieth century, when people on the
left side of the traditional political spectrum-that is, people who advocated more governmental
control over economic markets-started calling themselves "liberals." Economist Joseph
Schumpeter noted, "As a supreme, if unintended, compliment, the enemies of private enterprise
have thought it wise to appropriate its label." Thus, modern libertarians refer to the philosophy of
individualism, free markets, and limited government as "classical liberalism," although as
libertarian writer David Boaz observes, "[I]n this era of historical illiteracy, if you call yourself a
classical liberal, most people think you're an admirer of Teddy Kennedy!" Id. at 23.
99. LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (3d rev. ed. 1966);
see also LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION (3d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter MISES, LIBERALISM].
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key concepts, individualism and the supremacy of individual rights.100
Liberty, under this tradition, means freedom from physical compulsion. As
libertarians see it, only through the initiation of force-or fraud, which is an
indirect form of force-can individuals be deprived of their liberty. Thus,
libertarians see as the basic social rule the "no-harm principle": that no one
ought to harm another, by using force or fraud, to the detriment of another's
life, liberty, or property. l01
In Anglo-American political thought, libertarianism originated with the
seventeenth-century English radical Whig political writers, the most famous
of whom was John Locke.'0 2 Eighteenth-century radical Whig writers on
both sides of the Atlantic expanded upon Lockean ideas. 10 3 For example, the
authors of Cato's Letters-political essays originally published in the 1720s
which continued to influence America's founders during the Revolutionary
period-restricted the legitimate power of government to the protection of
"natural liberty."104 This libertarian Whig tradition had a continuing influence
on early American political thought well into the nineteenth century-for
100. BOAZ, supra note 97, at 2. Individualism, as understood by libertarians, means viewing
the individual as the basic unit of social analysis, regarding each individual as an end in one's
self. Id. at 16; see also DAVID CONWAY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM: THE UNVANQUISHED IDEAL
10 (1995) (basing the classical-liberal "system of natural liberty" on individualism, with respect
to both ends and means). Among the key concepts of modem libertarianism, in addition to
individualism, that Boaz identifies are as follows: limited government (the legitimate function of
government as limited to the protection of natural rights); the rule of law (a society of liberty
under law, in which individuals are free to pursue their own lives so long as they respect the equal
rights of others); free-market capitalism (including the principle of spontaneous order and the
concept of a natural harmony of interests among peaceful, productive people in a just society) and
non-aggression, or peace (the principle that it is wrong to initiate the use of force as a means to
achieve social or political goals). BOAZ, supra note 97, at 16-17.
101. On the no-harm principle generally, see T. PATRICK BuRKE, No HARM: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE MARKET (1993). Burke explains that the classical-liberal conception of
harm requires, first, that a person "harmed" by some action "must be worse off after the action
than he was before it," i.e., have "some deterioration in his condition"; and second, that "the
action in question must have caused the harm, that is, produced it." Thus, for example, under the
classical-liberal conception of harm, a worker is not "harmed" by accepting an offer of
employment at low wages. Id. at 46-47.
102. BOAZ, supra note 97, at 36. Although Boaz traces the roots of libertarianism as far back
as the Old Testament's Book of Samuel and sees the "first stirrings of clearly protoliberal ideas"
in the English Revolution of the 1640s, he dates "the birth of liberalism" to the Glorious
Revolution and specifically to the publication of Locke's Second Treatise of Government in 1690.
Id. at 28, 35-37. On the radical Whig tradition generally, see Mayer, Whigs, supra note 45.
103. On the eighteenth-century radical Whigs and their support for both American
independence and British Parliamentary reform, see Mayer, Whigs, supra note 45, at 164-74,
189-96.
104. "Cato," An Enquiry into the Nature and Extent of Liberty (Letter No. 62) (Jan. 20, 1721), in
1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND
RELIGIOUS, ANID OTHER LMPORTANT SUBJECTS 244-48 (photo. reprint 1969) (1733).
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example, on radical Jeffersonian Republicans and on the so-called
"Locofoco" wing of the Jacksonian Democratic party.
105
The nineteenth-century classical-liberal tradition took to its logical
extremes the English radical Whig ideas about maximizing individual liberty
and minimizing the role of government. Thus, the broad notion of liberty
adopted by the authors of Cato's Letters in the 1720s. 10 6 was applied
consistently and developed fully by nineteenth-century classical liberals into
the principle that everyone ought to be free to do as they please, so long as
they do not harm others or interfere with others' equal freedom. The most
famous expression of this principle was Herbert Spencer's "Law of Equal
Freedom": "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he
infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."'0 7 Similarly, Cato's
notion that the role of the magistrate was confined to the preservation of "this
natural Right" became, to nineteenth-century classical liberals, an absolute
limitation on the legitimate scope of governmental power. John Stuart Mill
espoused this principle in his popular tract On Liberty, first published in 1859,
which maintained that government should be limited to the role of
protecting individuals from harming one another:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection.... [T]he only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant ....l0
Mill then concluded, "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign." 10 9
105. See Eric Foner, Radical Individualism in America, LITERATURE OF LIBERTY 5 (Cato
Institute, July-Sept. 1978).
106. Cato wrote,
[T]he Power which every Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy the
Fruits of his Labour, Art, and Industry, as far as by it he hurts not the Society, or any
Members of it, by taking from any Member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he
himself enjoys.
"Cato," supra note 104, at 248.
107. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 95 (reprint, New York, Robert Schalkenbach
Foundation, 1970) (London, 1877). Spencer regarded this law as the "first principle," or "the
primary law of right relationship between man and man," and maintained it was "the prerequisite
to normal life in society," just as freedom was "the prerequisite to normal life in the individual."
Id. at 79, 95.
108. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS (ON
LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN) 15 (Oxford 1975).
109. Id.
Like modem libertarians, nineteenth-century classical liberals differed in
the philosophical foundations of their laissez-faire ideology: some grounded it
in pragmatic, utilitarian justifications while others grounded it in a moral
philosophy that saw individualism as an end in itself1 l° However they
grounded their ideology, they nevertheless reached the same fundamental
conclusion regarding the role of government. "As the liberal sees it," noted
the great twentieth-century classical-liberal Ludwig von Mises, "[T]he task of
the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life,
health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks." '' Libertarians
believe that the legitimate functions of government are confined, at most, to
those powers necessary to protect individuals from harming one another in
their persons or their property."12 Thus, "[T]he only actions that should be
forbidden by law are those that involve the initiation of force against those
who have not themselves used force-actions like murder, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, and fraud."'" 3 When government goes beyond this minimal role
of protecting persons or property against harm by others and instead seeks to
protect persons from harming themselves-when government invades the
realm of individual sovereignty described by John Stuart Mill-it loses its
legitimacy and becomes an invader rather than a protector of rights. Hence,
laissez-faire theorists, from nineteenth-century classical liberals to modem
libertarians, have opposed all forms of "legal patemalism" as illegitimate uses
of the coercive power of the law.114
110. See BOAZ, supra note 97, at 82-87 (distinguishing utilitarians from neo-natural rights
philosophers among modem libertarians). Albert Venn Dicey, the preeminent constitutional
authority in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, associated classical liberalism, insofar as it
related to British law, with the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and his disciples among the so-
called philosophical Radicals, including James Mill and John Stuart Mill. Nevertheless, he
recognized that important "speculative differences" distinguished the "utilitarian individualism"
of such thinkers as Mill from the "absolute individualism" of Spencer. ALBERT VENN DICEY,
LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 17 (photo. reprint 1981) (1914).
111. MISES, LIBERALISM, supra note 99, at 52. Mises added, "Everything that goes beyond
this is an evil"; a government that infringes these rights rather than protects them would be
"altogether bad." Id.
112. The qualifier at most recognizes the general split among modem libertarians between
anarchist libertarians (sometimes called "anarcho-capitalists"), who deny the legitimacy of
government altogether, and minimal-government libertarians, or minarchists. See generally
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998); BRUCE
L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE (1990).
113. BOAZ, supra note 97, at 2. The libertarian "no-harm," or non-aggression, principle
views fraud as a form of theft, tantamount to the initiation of physical force against others'
property. Id. at 74-75 (explaining, in simple terms, why fraud is a form of theft: "If I promise to
sell you a Heineken for a dollar, but I actually give you a Bud Light, I have stolen your dollar.").
114. See John Hospers, Libertarianism and Legal Paternalism, in THE LIBERTARIAN READER
135 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 1982) (defining "legal paternalism" as the view supporting the use of
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Like today's libertarians, the classical liberals of the early twentieth
century also were radicals, not conservatives. To fully implement their vision
of a free society, advocates of laissez-faire called for major changes in the
law-including many traditional principles of the Anglo-American common
law system." 5  Although many modem scholars-particularly non-
libertarians-mistakenly identify Anglo-American common law, as it had
evolved by the nineteenth century, with classical liberalism," 6 the two
traditions are distinct, based on fundamentally different premises and with
fundamentally different applications to the leading legal and public policy
questions of the early twentieth century.' 17
Sumner's book, What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, illustrates how
laissez-faire theorists' opposition to all forms of legal paternalism prompted
them to criticize not only the new uses for the police power proposed by
Progressive-era reformers but also many of the traditional uses of the police
legislation to protect people from themselves). Libertarians oppose all paternal legislation, except
for laws protecting those persons who cannot take care of themselves: namely, infants and
children, the senile, and mentally incompetent persons. Id. at 136-37. Thus, libertarians would
oppose laws that prohibit competent adults from using narcotic drugs, committing or attempting
to commit suicide, gambling, engaging in prostitution, or other so-called "victimless crimes."
See, e.g., GILBERT GElS, NOT THE LAW'S BUSINESS: AN EXAMINATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY,
ABORTION, PROSTITUTION, NARCOTICS, AND GAMBLING IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); PETER
MCWILLIAMS, AIN'T NOBODY'S BUSINESS IF YOU DO: THE ABSURDITY OF CONSENSUAL CRIMES
IN A FREE SOCIETY (1993).
115. Among these principles, of course, is the traditional concept of the police power and the
constitutional limits that constrained it. As discussed infra, laissez-faire theorists would change
traditional police-power jurisprudence at least as much as would "Progressive" reformers.
116. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 874, 888 n.49 (identifying the common law with the
"allocation of rights of use, ownership, transfer, and possession of property associated with
'laissez-faire' systems" and arguing that judges during the Lochner era measured the
constitutionality of state action against a free-market/common law "baseline").
117. In a devastating critique of Sunstein's article, Lochner's Legacy, David Bernstein has
argued that Sunstein misrepresented both the Supreme Court's understanding of common law
rules and the Court's decisions concerning constitutional limitations on the police power during
the Lochner era. David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2003)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Legacy]. With regard to the former, he shows that contrary to Sunstein's
claim that the Court treated common law rules as "natural and immutable," the Court rather
regarded them as mutable and contingent; for example, the Court consistently upheld federal and
state workers' compensation statutes even though they replaced common law rights and duties
with new statutory schemes that included many novel features. Id. at 23-32. With regard to
police powers, Bernstein also shows that the Court rarely interfered with redistributive legislation
claimed to be within the states' police power. Id. at 34-42. Moreover, he shows that the Court's
"civil liberties" decisions-including its protection for liberty of contract-during the Lochner
era cannot be explained by the theory that the Court was protecting common law distributions of
wealth; rather, the Court used substantive due process "to protect what it considered the
fundamental liberties of Americans from arbitrary or unreasonable legislation." Id. at 47. Thus,
he concludes, Sunstein's article "shows the danger of applying an ideological construct to
constitutional history for presentist purposes, while ignoring or neglecting contrary evidence."
Id. at 63. This is the vice that legal historians condemn as "lawyers' history."
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power championed by conservatives of the time. Sumner devoted much of
the book to his thesis that all "schemes" for government intervention
advocated by "social reformers," presumably to aid certain persons or
classes," 8 really violate the rights of the "Forgotten Man," the prudent,
responsible, tax-paying citizen.' 19 Sumner particularly condemned two types
of such "schemes" that were popular in his time: liquor prohibition laws,
20
which were advocated by a coalition of "Progressive" social reformers and
conservative Victorian-era moralists;' 21 and the protective tariff,122 which was
118. All the "schemes and projects" for "the organized intervention of society through the
State" may be reduced to a simple formula, Sumner argued: "A and B decide what C shall do for
D." A and B are the "social reformers," who are unmindful of the single great duty that all
individuals owe one another in society-Sumner's version of the Golden Rule--"Mind your own
business." Instead, they attempt to mind other people's business, by advocating use of the
coercive power of government to come to the aid of D, the "poor man," who is Sumner's model
for all persons who are "negligent, shiftless, inefficient, silly, and imprudent." The one whose
interest is overlooked in such schemes is C, the "industrious and prudent," whom Sumner calls
"the Forgotten Man." SUMNER, supra note 86, at 20-22.
119. As described by Sumner, the "Forgotten Man" is "worthy, industrious, independent, and
self-supporting"; "he minds his own business and makes no complaint," id. at 110, and yet he is
the one "threatened by every extension of the paternal theory of government" because "[i]t is he
who must work and pay." Id. at 130. "The real victim is the Forgotten Man":
the man who has watched his own investments, made his own machinery safe, attended
to his own plumbing, and educated his own children, and who, just when he wants to
enjoy the fruits of his care, is told that it is his duty to go and take care of some of his
negligent neighbors, or, if he does not go, to pay an inspector to go.
Id. at 119. Noting how women had entered the workforce by the late nineteenth century, Sumner
added, "We must not overlook the fact that the Forgotten Man is not infrequently a woman." Id.
at 126. To Sumner, "the Forgotten Man and the Forgotten Woman are the real productive
strength of the country," the people who work and vote-and generally pray-but whose "chief
business in life," thanks to the social reformers, is "to pay." Id. at 128-29.
120. Sumner used liquor prohibition as the chief example in his argument that "[t]he fallacy
of all prohibitory, sumptuary, and moral legislation is the same":
A and B determine to be teetotalers, which is often a wise determination, and
sometimes a necessary one .... But A and B put their heads together to get a law
passed which shall force C to be a teetotaler for the sake of D [the "poor man"-in this
case, the alcoholic], who is in danger of drinking too much.... Who is C? He is the
man who wants alcoholic liquors for any honest purpose whatsoever, who would use
his liberty without abusing it, who would occasion no public question, and trouble
nobody at all. He is the Forgotten Man again.
Id. at 115. With regard to anti-vice legislation generally, Sumner maintained that "[a]lmost all
legislative effort to prevent vice is really protective of vice, because all such legislation saves the
vicious man from the penalty of his vice." He added, "Nature's remedies against vice are
terrible" and "without pity"; and he was without pity himself with regard to alcohol abuse: "A
drunkard in the gutter is just where he ought to be, according to the fitness and tendency of
things." Id. at 113-14.
121. The coalitions that formed the temperance and prohibition movements, culminating in
the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, are nicely summarized in RICHARD B.
BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA 170-77 (1993).
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advocated by business interests and was a key plank in the political platform
of the Republican Party and its predecessor, the Whig Party, throughout the
nineteenth century. 123 Both liquor prohibitinn la.vs and the protcctive tariff, it
should be noted, comfortably fit within the traditional scope of the exercise of
government regulatory powers: prohibition, as a protection of public health or
morality under the police power; 124 the tariff, as a trade regulation supposed to
foster domestic economic development. 125  Sumner also criticized
government regulations of the labor market, regardless whether such laws
were traditional exercises of the police power to protect health or morals or
were the new forms of "protective" legislation advocated by Progressive
reformers.1 26  Maintaining that "free men in a free state" ought to "protect
themselves,"' 127 Sumner advocated total freedom of contract in labor:
employers and employees should freely bargain over wages, hours, and
working conditions, making contracts "on the best terms which they can agree
122. Sumner condemned the protective tariff as the worst form of "jobbery," which he
defined as "any scheme which aims to gain, not by the legitimate fruits of industry and enterprise,
but by extorting from somebody a part of his product under guise of some pretended industrial
undertaking." SUMNER, supra note 86, at 120, 122. He called jobbery "the greatest social evil"
of his time, and he considered it "the vice of plutocracy," which was corrupting the democratic
and republican form of government in the United States. Id. at 122. In the case of the protective
tariff, the "Forgotten Man" is the consumer who must pay more for the goods he imports; the
"poor man" who is the supposed beneficiary of this form of "corporate welfare" (as it would be
called today) is the business that benefits from the indirect government subsidy that the tariff on
his competitors' goods provides.
123. See, e.g., DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION: THE CRISIS OF POPULAR
GOVERNMENT, 1830-1870, at 233-34 (1978). Donald notes that in the late nineteenth century,
the tariff issue was "seldom debated in terms of free trade versus protectionism." He adds,
"Except for a few doctrinaire economic theorists, everybody recognized some tariff barrier was
required to protect some American industries." Id. at 233. Needless to say, Sumner was one of
those "doctrinaire theorists" who disagreed.
124. As the Supreme Court's decision in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), illustrates,
courts generally upheld liquor prohibition laws as valid exercises of the police power to protect
public health or morals.
125. Congress's authority to impose protective tariffs, either under its taxing power or its
regulatory power over foreign commerce, was never successfully challenged in court, although
antebellum Southerners-most famously, the "nullifiers" of South Carolina-strenuously
objected to protective tariffs as an abuse of congressional power. See, e.g., WILLIAM W.
FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA,
1816-1836(1966).
126. Among the laws addressed by Sumner were those providing for government inspection
of workplaces, "[t]he safety of workmen from machinery, the ventilation and sanitary
arrangements required by factories, the special precautions of certain processes," as well as
Sunday-closing laws, laws limiting the hours of labor of women and children, and laws setting
"limits of age for employed children." SUMNER, supra note 86, at 82-83.
127. Id. at 83. Sumner opposed paternal legislation even for the protection of women and
children, arguing that free laborers "ought to protect their own women and children," either
individually or through collective bargaining, rather than rely on government to do so. Id.
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upon.''128 He recognized workers' freedom to strike as a legitimate last resort
in the bargaining process, 129 and he regarded trade unions as "right and useful,
and perhaps, necessary"13 0-and so took a far more benign view of labor
unions than did the courts of his time, which tended to regard unions as
unlawful combinations in restraint of trade, under Anglo-American common
law precedents.131
The so-called Progressive movement, which arose in the late nineteenth
century and became increasingly influential in the early decades of the
twentieth century,' 32 was itself based on the paternalistic and collectivist
threads that ran through the Anglo-American common law tradition. Like the
Fabian socialists, their counterparts in Britain, who harkened back to the
"Tory paternalism" of the eighteenth-century, 133 American Progressives
128. Id. at 75. He saw labor contracts, contracts between "employers and employed," as
essentially no different from other forms of contracts-those between "buyers and sellers, renters
and hirers, borrowers and lenders" and preferred that government not interfere in any contracts,
leaving their terms to the parties' negotiations and the natural laws of supply and demand. Id.
129. Id. at 80. Although he maintained that "a strike is a legitimate resort at last," and that it
is "like war, for it is war," he also doubted whether strikes for higher wages were "expedient."
Id.
130. Id. at 83. In calling unions "right and useful," Sumner recognized workers' rights of
freedom of association and saw unions' value in raising workers' wages. Id. He also saw them
as useful in other ways: "to spread information, to maintain esprit de corps, to elevate the public
opinion of the class." Id. at 81. Without saying so explicitly, Sumner's view that "it may be that
[unions] are necessary" was his answer to the argument that employers and employees had
unequal bargaining strength. Id. He did regard unions as "an exotic and imported institution"
and saw many of their rules and methods, "having been developed in England to meet English
circumstances," as "out of place" in America; hence, he argued, unions needed "development,
correction, and perfection" in the United States. Id. at 82-84.
131. See, e.g., Arthur F. McEvoy, Freedom of Contract, Labor, and the Administrative State,
in SCHEIBER, supra note 5, at 214-16 (summarizing courts' use of labor injunctions against even
peaceful union activity).
132. As briefly observed in supra note 12, the Progressive reform movement was a diverse
coalition of persons who sought to increase government regulation of economic and social life.
See HOFSTADTER, supra note 12; see also James W. Ely, Jr., Melville W. Fuller Reconsidered,
1988 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 36 (observing that the Progressives "championed greater governmental
intervention in American life and constructed a version of constitutional history serviceable for
their purpose"). A pithy definition of a Progressive reformer was offered by the free-thinking early
twentieth-century journalist H. L. Mencken as "one who is favor of more taxes instead of less, more
bureaus and jobholders, more paternalism and meddling, more regulation of private affairs and less
liberty." THE QUOTABLE CONSERVATIVE 145 (Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Berent eds., 1995) (quoting
Mencken in the [Baltimore] Evening Sun, Jan. 19, 1926).
133. Albert Venn Dicey suggested this parallel in his classic work, Law and Public Opinion
in England During the Nineteenth Century, which divided the century into three periods based
upon the dominant public opinion in each: the period of"Old Toryism or Legislative Quiescence"
(1800-1830), characterized by traditionalism; the period of "Benthamism or Individualism"
(1825-1870), characterized by utilitarian classical-liberal reforms; and the period of
"Collectivism" (1865-1900), characterized by the forms of state intervention favored by socialist
reformers. DICEY, supra note 110, at 62-65. As Dicey saw it, the brief mid-century period in
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championed various "protective" labor laws (particularly regarding women,
children, and other supposedly vulnerable classes of workers), 3 4 liquor
prohibition and other forms of paternal morals legislation, and in general a
category of laws called "social legislation" by modem scholars. 35  Not
surprisingly, both traditionalist conservatives and laissez-faire reformers
viewed the so-called "reform" agenda of the Progressives as a reactionary
return to a form of government paternalism, turning the clock back from a
society based on contract to one again based on status. 1
36
which classical-liberal reform ideas dominated gave way to the collectivism of the late Victorian
period. That collectivism curtailed freedom of contract "as surely as individualism [had]
extend[ed it]." Id. at 264. And by using collective action on behalf of the interests of organized
labor-for example, in the Combination Act (Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875)
and Trade Union Acts (1871-1876)--it used governmental power to favor unions just as the
earliest Combination Act (1800) had favored employers by outlawing unions.t Dicey contrasted
the combination laws of both the early- and late-nineteenth century (the laws of 1800 and 1875)
with the "Benthamite" legislation of 1825, which he viewed as neutral with regard to employer-
worker disputes, consistent with the dominant spirit of individualism in mid-century Britain: the
1825 law "was intended to establish free trade in labour, and allowed, or tolerated, trade
combinations, only in so far as they were part of and conducive to such freedom of trade." Id. at
270. Late-Victorian laws, like the 1875 Combination Act and other labor laws, echoed the "Tory
paternalism" of the first third of the century, which was in turn based on England's centuries-old
tradition of paternal government. Id. at 101-02.
134. So-called "protective laws" for women were, in the words of one scholar, "as much as
anything designed to keep them out of the labor market; at a minimum, their underlying premise
was that women properly belonged in the private sphere and were constitutionally unsuited for
the wage-labor market." McEvoy, supra note 13 1, at 218. On the harmful effects of "protective"
legislation upon women's employment, see Joan Kennedy Taylor, Protective Labor Legislation, in
FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE 187, 190 (Wendy McElroy ed., 2d ed. 1991), for the following
assertion: "Protective legislation for women actually diminishes the employment opportunities of
women."); see also Elisabeth M. Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-Hours Laws on the
Employment of Women in 1920, 88 J. POL. EcON. 476 (1980) (an empirical study of the 1920s,
showing that maximum-hours laws significantly reduced female employment in manufacturing).
135. As described supra note 37, the term social legislation is a modem term of art-not used
by the Supreme Court prior to 1940-that originated in nineteenth-century Germany and referred
to measures "intended for the relief and elevation of the less favored classes of the community."
McCurdy, supra note 37, at 162-63. Not only were these laws unprecedented in that they did not
fall within the traditional scope of the police power to protect public health, safety, and morality;
but these laws also would be considered unconstitutional under nineteenth-century prohibitions of
"partial" or "class" legislation, for by promoting the special interests of certain economic classes,
they perfectly fit the traditional definition of such invalid class laws. See GILLMAN, supra note
29, at 158-59 (discussing the unprecedented nature of minimum wage legislation).
136. Christopher Tiedeman, the laissez faire constitutionalist whose views are discussed in
the next section, warned in his book The Unwritten Constitution (1890), that
the old superstition that government has the power to banish evil from the earth, if it
could only be induced to declare the supposed causes illegal, has been revived .... The
State is called on to protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to
determine what wages a workman shall receive for his labor, and how many hours he
shall labor. Many trades and occupations are being prohibited, because some are
damaged incidentally by their prosecution, and many ordinary pursuits are made
government monopolies. The demands of the Socialists and Communists vary in
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Because the idea of pervasive government regulation of economic and
social life seems to hark back to medieval, pre-industrial public policy, many
modem libertarians regard the term Progressive as a misnomer. A truly
"progressive" policy, from the libertarian perspective, would fully implement
the nineteenth-century classical-liberal vision of free-market capitalism with
minimal government intrusions -a vision which, as William Graham
Sumner's work suggests, was as far removed from the traditional
understanding of the police power to regulate public health, safety, order, and
morality as was the newer, virtually unlimited scope of the police power
advocated by Progressive reformers. Thus, it could be argued that in early
twentieth-century American debates over law and public policy, both laissez-
faire and Progressivism were competing "counter-currents" of opinion,
138
both challenging the status quo, the traditional understanding of the police
power.
C. Judicial Review and Two Paradigms of Liberty
Perhaps the greatest misunderstanding, or myth, concerning judicial
protection of liberty of contract in the early twentieth century was that it
resulted from an illegitimate "activist" jurisprudence in which judges, rather
than following objective standards of constitutional law, were following their
own subjective views. As discussed in this Article's Introduction section,
much recent revisionist scholarship of the Lochner era-by both scholars
who are sympathetic to, and scholars who are hostile to, liberty of contract-
has challenged this myth. Even some Progressive-era scholars, who sought to
degree and in detail, but the most extreme of them insist upon the assumption by
government of the paternal character altogether, abolishing all private property in land,
and making the State the sole possessor of the working capital of the nation.
Mayer, Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 117-18 (quoting CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79-80 (1890)). Tiedeman's warning about
the advent of "the absolutism of a democratic majority" was echoed by John F. Dillon, president
of the then-conservative American Bar Association, in his address at the ABA's 1892 convention.
"[W]hat is now to be feared and guarded against is the despotism of the many-of the majority,"
Dillon observed, calling upon the legal profession "to defend, protect and preserve our legal
institutions unimpaired," in the face of "popular demands" threatening private property, through
"unjust or discriminatory legislation in the exercise of the power of taxation, or of eminent
domain, or of that elastic power known as the police power." John F. Dillon, Presidential
Address to the American Bar Association (1892), in SOURCES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY, supra note 63, at 143.
137. Self-described "liberals" and "Progressives" who might oppose such a free-market
policy as "reactionary" are the true reactionaries, from the libertarian perspective. As Isabel
Paterson, the great twentieth-century laissez-faire writer, observed, "If you go back 150 years you
are a reactionary; but if you go back 1,000 years, you are in the foremost ranks of progress."
Isabel Paterson, A Paterson Collection, LIBERTY, Oct. 1993, at 39.
138. See DICEY, supra note 110, at 37 (defining counter-current as "a body of opinion, belief,
or sentiment more or less directly opposed to the dominant opinion of a particular era").
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rewrite constitutional history to advance their political agenda, did not really
believe the orthodox criticism that Lochner-era judges were "activists.,
139
In modem debates over constitutional interpretation, the "judicial
activist" label has become virtually "an all-purpose term of opprobrium," used
by both the left and the right as an epithet to criticize court decisions they
disagree with.1 40 Notwithstanding the variety of definitions of activism that
scholars have advanced-most of them regarding activism as bad, or even
pernicious, but with a few seeing it in a more positive light 141 -it is possible
to define the term, at least when used pejoratively, to describe illegitimate
judicial behavior, in a conceptually meaningful way. The term originated
during the late 1940s, at a time when the justices on the Supreme Court,
although all New Deal "liberals," nevertheless were divided over issues of
constitutional interpretation. 142 As originally used then, and as resurrected in
139. Roscoe Pound rejected the prevalent view that in protecting liberty of contract, judges
were deciding cases according to their own "personal, social, and economic views," even though
he criticized liberty of contract as based on what he regarded as an outmoded jurisprudence.
Pound, supra note 13, at 457-58. On the Progressives' reshaping of constitutional interpretation
and history to advance their political agenda, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How
PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
140. Arthur D. Hellman, Judicial Activism: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 21 MISS. C. L.
REV. 253 (2002). After discussing various definitions of judicial activism, the author proposes
one of his own, inspired by Judge Richard Posner: decisions "that expand the power of the
judiciary over political institutions." Id. The problem with that definition is that it equates
activism with judicial review, for any decision declaring a law passed by a legislature
unconstitutional may be seen as an outcome adverse to the result reached through the political
process. Id. at 264.
141. Some modem libertarian scholars during the late 1980s, at the height of the controversy
over Robert Bork's failed nomination to the Supreme Court, sought to defend a broad judicial
protection of liberty rights as a so-called "principled judicial activism." See generally Randy E.
Barnett, Judicial Conservatism v. A Principled Judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
273 (1987); STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1987). Of course, by
calling it "principled," they were really saying that it was not activism at all but rather
justifiable-albeit vigorous-use of the judicial review power to protect legitimate constitutional
rights. More recently, taking note how some leftists have criticized the conservative decisions of
the Rehnquist Court as "activist," Barnett has argued that the term, "while clearly pejorative, is
generally empty." Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an "Activist" Court? The Commerce
Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2002).
142. The first recorded use of the term judicial activism occurred in a popular magazine,
Fortune, in a 1947 article by the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., profiling all nine justices on the
Supreme Court at that time. Schlesinger characterized Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge as the "Judicial Activists" who were willing to let the Court use its judicial review
powers for "wholesome social purposes," such as "to protect the underdog or to safeguard basic
human rights." He called Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton the "Champions of Self-
Restraint," who were skeptical of individual judges' notions of justice and who preferred to defer
to the legislative will. He regarded the other two members of the Court, Justice Reed and Chief
Justice Vinson, as a middle group. Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meaning of
"Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1445-49 (2004) (summarizing Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1947, FORTUNE, Jan. 1947). Publication of Schlesinger's
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recent decades by conservative critics of the Warren Court, 143 the term
judicial activism refers to the practice of judges deciding cases according to
their own subjective policy preferences or desired results, rather than
according to established, objective legal principles. 144  Judge Laurence
Silberman has used the term in this sense when he defined it as "policymaking
in the guise of interpreting and applying law."'145 This is the sense in which
"activism" is most frequently deplored, in political dialogue today, as judges
who "legislate from the bench"; 146 and it also used in the sense in which
judicial protection of liberty of contract during the Lochner era was criticized
by the orthodox Holmesian view, the view that coined the term
"Lochnerizing" as a pejorative synonymous with improper judicial activism.
Properly speaking, then, an "activist judge" is one who decides the
outcome of a given case or controversy according to subjective values-his
or her personal convictions-rather than following so-called "neutral
principles" or objective standards for interpreting laws and constitutional
provisions. 147 The basic vice of judicial activism, as understood in this sense,
is that it violates the fundamental American constitutional principle of
article preceded the famous dialogue between Justices Black and Frankfurter in their dissenting
and concurring opinions, respectively, in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), over the
incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees in the Fourteenth Amendment.
143. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 22, 22-
30 (1985) (explaining the Reagan administration's preferred "jurisprudence of original intention,"
as an antidote to result-oriented "chameleon" jurisprudence of the activist Warren Court).
144. This definition combines elements of three of the five different meanings of judicial
activism identified by Keenan Kmiec: "judicial legislation," "departures from accepted
interpretive methodology," and "result-oriented judging." Kmiec, supra note 142, at 1471-76.
145. Laurence H. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism? A
Retrospective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 607, 618 (1998). Judge Silberman identifies policy
issues as "those questions of public concern on which the body politic or political institutions
have free range of choice"; those questions are resolved by legislatures or constitutional
conventions when they "crystallize" the majority view into rules. Id. According to Sieberman,
"[I]f a judge exercises policy choice when deciding what these rules mean," that judge is an
"activist." Id.
146. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 142, at 1471 ("to appoint strict constructionists who would
hew closely to the law rather than judicial activists whom he said were prone to 'legislate from
the bench.' 'We want people to interpret the law, not try to make law and write law,' he said.")
(quoting Bush: No Moderate Judges, NEWSDAY, Mar. 29, 2002, at A 16).
147. The concept of "neutral principles"-the idea that judicial decision making should be
based on principles that transcend the specific issue presented to the Court-has been developed
by modem jurists to help justify judicial review and to reconcile it with the American
commitment to democracy, or popular sovereignty. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring
Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). In his classic 1959
Harvard Law Review article, Professor Wechsler identified a "genuinely principled" decision-
making process as one "resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved." Wechsler,
supra, at 15.
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separation of powers, for it is an abuse of the courts' legitimate judicial
power: it is an attempt to usurp the law-making, or legislative, power that
our constitutions (both state and federal) vest in the legislative branch of
government. To avoid this problem, American courts themselves have
devised the self-limiting principle known as the nonjusticiability, or
"political questions" doctrine, which holds that courts should refrain from
deciding subject matter inappropriate for judicial consideration.' 48 When a
court disregards this doctrine, it tends to use policy arguments-the kind of
arguments more appropriately made in a legislative chamber rather than in
a courtroom-to support its decision.
149
Activist jurisprudence is result oriented, focused on reaching the
particular result or outcome that a judge desires in a particular case. What
makes a given decision "activist," however, is not the result it reaches but
the methodology it employs-the reasoning the judge gives in support of
his or her decision. Although most decisions that are criticized as "activist"
are decisions in which the courts strike down laws as unconstitutional,
courts may be activist (i.e., violate objective principles of judicial decision-
making) equally by upholding laws against constitutional challenge. A
court abuses its judicial review power by being "activist" when it decides
questions of constitutionality in impermissible ways, regardless whether it
ultimately finds the law in question either constitutional or
unconstitutional. Some of the most egregious examples of judicial
148. On the nonjusticiability doctrine, see generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125-37 (7th ed. 2004). One of the clearest and most
frequently cited examples of the Supreme Court violating this doctrine is the Dred Scott decision
of 1857, when a majority of the justices took it upon themselves to decide the controversial
political question of slavery in the western territories. By holding that the Fifth Amendment due
process clause required Congress to permit slavery in territories-and by rejecting the equally
plausible reading of the Fifth Amendment urged by Republicans, which required Congress to
forbid slavery in territories-the Court, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, had
decided a nonjusticiable question of policy and hence was guilty ofjudicial activism, at least as
Republicans at the time saw it. See supra notes 63-65 for a discussion.
149. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court in a series of decisions beginning in 1997 has
held that the state's system for funding public schools violates the provision in the Ohio
Constitution empowering the legislature to fund "a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the State." DeRolph v. Ohio, 728 N.E. 2d 993, 1029 (Ohio 2000) (Moyer,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, writing the opinion for the three dissenting
justices in the second of these decisions, accused the majority of violating the nonjusticiability
doctrine by attempting to decide the policy question of what constitutes a "thorough and
efficient" system. He also noted, "[Diecisions regarding the level of educational quality to be
made available to Ohio school children are dependent upon policy considerations-political,
budgetary, and value judgments-that require a balancing of interests that is not appropriately
struck in the Supreme Court of Ohio. 'The judicial branch is simply neither equipped nor
empowered to make these kinds of decisions."' Id.
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activism, in the proper sense of the term, are cases where courts have
upheld laws they should have found unconstitutional. 50
Judicial protection of liberty of contract, as done by the Supreme Court
in the early twentieth century, was not "activist" under this definition. Nor
was it in any real sense "laissez-faire constitutionalism," protecting liberty in
the broad sense advocated by classical-liberal, or libertarian, philosophers.
Rather, in protecting liberty of contract, the Supreme Court followed a more
moderate approach that applied neutral principles of constitutional law. To
show this, the remainder of this section will examine two different
approaches, or paradigms, for judicial protection of liberty. The first is the
more radical, and arguably, more activist, 15' pure laissez-faire approach that
the Court would have followed if it truly had done what Justice Holmes
accused the majority of doing in Lochner, that is, of constitutionalizing the
Law of Equal Freedom as articulated in Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. The
second is the more restrained, moderately libertarian approach that the Court
actually followed in protecting liberty of contract, which was nothing more
than a general presumption in favor of liberty that could be rebutted by a
showing that the challenged governmental action fit within one of the
recognized "exceptions," as a valid exercise of the police power.
1. The Radical Paradigm: True "Laissez-faire Constitutionalism"
What would it have meant for the Supreme Court and other courts
during the Lochner era to have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as if it
had "enact[ed] Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," as Justice Holmes
accused the majority of doing in Lochner?5 1 In other words, what would be
150. In Part III of this Article, the Court's post-1937 decisions upholding federal and state
New Deal legislation-and abandoning all but minimal "rational basis" substantive due process
protection for economic liberty-better fit the model of activist jurisprudence than do its pre-1937
decisions protecting liberty of contract. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for the majority in West Coast, for example, was based largely on
the justices' agreement with the policy arguments advanced by the state in favor of minimum-
wage laws. Id.
151. Because this Article focuses on what the Court actually did in protecting liberty of
contract by arguing that it did not follow the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" caricature created
by the Holmesian orthodox view of the Lochner era, it does not address the question whether a
true model of laissez-faire constitutionalism really would have been "activist," in the sense
described above. That is an open question because it is not clear that consistent and rigorous
protection of liberty, as defined by the classical-liberal philosophy, would have been a vi-olation
of the neutral principles doctrine. It could be argued that a true laissez-faire constitutionalism,
indeed, would have better fit the neutral principles model than the model actually followed by the
Court. And certainly, true laissez-faire constitutionalism would have better fit the model than the
Court's post-1937 substantive due process jurisprudence, with its "double standard" and various,
inconsistent tests for the protection of certain rights.
152. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the results of a true laissez-faire constitutionalism-one that protected liberty
as an absolute, as broadly as Holmes implied, with his paraphrasing of
Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom, as "[t]he liberty of the citizen to do as he
likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the
same"? 153  Although Holmes himself in his Lochner dissent suggested an
answer-one that exposed the falsity of his own claim' 54-- one need not rely
on speculation to construct a radical paradigm for the judicial protection of
liberty, as laissez-faire theorists would advocate. Something close to such a
paradigm may be found in the legal literature of the time.
The leading advocate of incorporating the laissez-faire philosophy into
constitutional law-that is, of a true laissez-faire constitutionalism-was
Christopher G. Tiedeman. 155 Tiedeman was one of the foremost American
legal scholars at the turn of the last century; a respected law teacher and
treatise writer, he was the author of a treatise on the limitations of the police
power which commentators long have regarded as the preeminent work of
laissez-faire constitutionalism.156  Although Tiedeman shared with
153. Id.
154. Id. at 75-76. Holmes listed several laws, upheld by the Court as valid exercises of the
police power, that to him seemed inconsistent with Spencer's "shibboleth," as he referred to the
Law of the Equal Freedom. These included Sunday closing laws, usury laws, the prohibition of
lotteries, "school laws" (probably meant as a reference to compulsory-attendance laws), the Post
Office, and the Massachusetts vaccination law upheld by the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905). That virtually all these laws would be regarded as illegitimate paternal
legislation by laissez-faire theorists (whether late-nineteenth century classical liberals or modern-
day libertarians) and that the Court did uphold them as valid police powers may suggest either
that the Court was inconsistent in its protection of liberty, as Holmes was implying, or rather that
the Court was not following a laissez-faire approach at all. For example, in Jacobson, the Court
upheld the Massachusetts compulsory vaccination law because the majority saw it has having a
"real or substantial relation to the protection of the public health and public safety," against
infectious diseases such as smallpox. Id. at 31. The liberty of the individual, including control
over one's own body, in this case yielded to what the majority saw as "reasonable regulations"
required to protect the safety of the general public. Only two justices-the most libertarian
members of the Court at that time, Justices Breyer and Peckham-dissented, without opinions.
Modem scholars might debate whether such a compulsory vaccination law, at least under the real
threat of a public epidemic, truly violates libertarian principles; or, put another way, whether
one's freedom not to be vaccinated and thus to be potentially a carrier of infectious disease falls
within the legitimate scope of liberty as defined under the no-harm principle.
155. For a short biographical sketch of Christopher Gustavus Tiedeman (1857-1903), see
Mayer, Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 102-03. Having studied law in Germany at a time when the
German sociological school of jurisprudence was rising in influence, Tiedeman defies the
stereotype associating laissez-faire constitutionalism with a rigid, formalistic conception of the
law; rather, he grounded his laissez-faire views on the newer, sociological theories of
jurisprudence-and particularly the German school, which saw the law as resulting from "the
prevalent sense of right" (Rechsgefuehl), as it evolves in society. See id. at 102-09, 124-25.
156. Id. at 97-98. Tiedeman's work, first published in 1886 under the title A Treatise on the
Limitations of Police Power in the United States, was published again in 1900 as a two-volume
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conservatives of his age a general aversion to what he called "the radical
experimentation of social reformers,"' 5 7 he surely went much further than
most of his contemporaries in denouncing all forms of legal paternalism. In
this respect, Tiedeman outshone the other leading treatise writer of the late
nineteenth century, Thomas M. Cooley, who was less consistent and far less
radical in his constitutional defense of liberty. 5 8 Tiedeman, in short, was to
constitutional law what William Graham Sumner was to political theory
generally: a fairly pure exponent of the laissez-faire philosophy.
As Tiedeman understood the police power, it was limited by various
constitutional provisions' 59 as well as by unwritten higher law principles.
160
By far the most important limitation which Tiedeman placed on state power,
however, was tied neither to the text of the Constitution nor to unwritten
higher law; rather, it was a limitation which inhered in the very definition of
the police power. The government's police power, "as understood in the
constitutional law of the United States," he wrote, "is simply the power of the
government to establish provisions for the enforcement of the common as
well as civil law maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas."' 6' The
work, in an expanded second edition, under the title A Treatise on State and Federal Control of
Persons and Property in the United States.
157. 1 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF
PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES ix (The Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1900).
158. Although Progressive-movement scholars such as Clyde Jacobs and Benjamin Twiss
usually identified both Tiedeman and Cooley as leading laissez-faire writers, even they
recognized that Cooley at most only anticipated the purer laissez-faire constitutionalism of
Tiedeman. See JACOBS, supra note 7, at 62; TwIss, supra note 7, passim. Comparing Cooley's
treatise to Tiedeman's, one historian has noted that Tiedeman's narrow interpretation of the
police power "revealed a much more extreme laissez-faire bias than Cooley's treatise." FINE,
supra note 36, at 154. This comparison can be illustrated by Cooley's and Tiedeman's different
conclusions regarding the constitutionality of usury laws, discussed infra note 167.
159. Tiedeman's list of provisions in the U.S. Constitution that limited governmental power,
state or federal, included Article I, Sections 9 and 10; the Bill of Rights; and the Civil War
amendments. I TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, § 4, at 18-20.
160. Citing approvingly Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798), that "certain vital principles in our free Republican governments" also limited the
legislative power, Tiedeman added that no law could be enforced that does not "conform to the
fundamental principles of free government" or which "violates reason and offends against the
prevalent conceptions of right and justice" in the United States. 1 TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, §
2, at 8-11.
161. Id. § 1, at 4-5. The Latin maxim is translated literally as "so use your own so as not to harm
that of another." In Anglo-American common law, especially in the law of nuisance, the word tuo
(your own) was generally understood to refer to property, particularly to real property; but as used by
Tiedeman, the word applied not only to property but also to liberty: it obliged everyone to utilize
one's "own"--to use one's own property, to exercise one's own liberty--so as not to harm that (the
property or the liberty) of another. Thus, to Tiedeman, the sic utere maxim was tantamount to
Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom.
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legitimate exercise of the police power thus was limited to enforcing the sic
utere principle:
Any law which goes beyond that principle, which undertakes to
abolish rights, the exercise of which does not involve an
infringement of the rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights
beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and the
general security, cannot be included in the police power of the
government.1
62
Because Tiedeman also defined liberty in terms of the sic utere principle,
his formulation meant that individuals should be free to act provided they do
not harm others or interfere with others' like freedom-in short, legal
protection for Herbert Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom.1
63
Throughout both editions of his treatise on the police power,'
64
Tiedeman drew a basic distinction between legitimate regulations (i.e.,
regulations that affected only trespasses or other matter of legitimate
governmental concerns under Tiedeman's formulation) regulations that went
beyond the proper scope of the police power.' 65 He sought not merely to
summarize the state of the law as it had developed by his time but rather to
162. Id. Tiedeman added that such a law is "a governmental usurpation," violating "the
principles of abstract justice, as they have been developed under our republican institutions." Id.
163. In the first edition of his treatise on the police power, Tiedeman defined liberty as "that
amount of personal freedom, which is consistent with a strict obedience" to the sic utere rule. He
also explained why that definition led logically to Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom:
"That man is free who is protected from injury," and his protection involves necessarily
the restraint of other individuals from the commission of the injury. In the proper
balancing of the contending interests of individuals, personal liberty is secured and
developed; any further restraint is unwholesome and subversive of liberty. As Herbert
Spencer has expressed it, "every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his
faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man."
CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES § 30 (The Lawbook Exchange 2001) (1886) (quoting HERBERT SPENCER,
SOCIAL STATICS 94 (1851)).
164. In the fourteen-year interval between the publications of the two editions of the work,
case law had so expanded that Tiedeman required two volumes to "corral every important
adjudication, which has been made by the State and Federal courts," on the various branches of
the subject. 1 TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, at ix. The change in the title of the treatise, from
Limitations of Police Power to State and Federal Control of Persons and Property, also reflected
the growth of national government powers, especially through the interstate commerce clause.
See Mayer, Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 128-29.
165. Significantly, Tiedeman organized his treatise not in terms of types of regulations, but
rather in terms of the types of rights restricted or burdened, with a threefold general classification:
personal rights (including personal security, liberty, and private property), relative rights (arising
between husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, or master and servant), and
statutory rights. 1 TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, § 5, at 20-21.
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show what the law should be, given his general formulation of the police
power. Thus, for example, Tiedeman condemned as unconstitutional not only
laws regulating the hours or wages of workers, 166 but also usury laws, 67 the
protective tariff,168 anti-miscegenation laws, 169 and even laws regulating
morality through the prohibition of such vices as gambling or the use of
narcotic drugs.170 With regard to the latter, Tiedeman distinguished vice from
crime, 171 arguing that actions harmful only to oneself did not fall within the
legitimate scope of the police power:
The object of the police power is the prevention of crime, the
protection of rights against the assault of others. The police power of
the government cannot be brought into operation for the purpose of
exacting obedience to the rules of morality, and banishing vice and
sin from the world.... The municipal law has only to do with
trespasses. It cannot be called into play in order to save one from the
evil consequences of his own vices, for the violation of a right by the
action of another must be exist or be threatened, in order to justify
the interference of law. 1
72
166. On laws regulating wages, see id. §§ 99, 100, at 316-30; on laws regulating hours, see
id. § 102, at 33-38; see also Mayer, Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 139-44.
167. On usury laws, see I TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, § 106, at 351-53. "Free trade in
money is as much a right as free trade in merchandise," Tiedeman maintained, because "[i]nterest
is nothing more than the price asked for the use of money," and price is determined by the law of
"supply and demand." Id. at 351. Tiedeman noted that usury laws originated in medieval
England, where the lending of money was a special privilege, conferred by Parliament, in the
days when the common law condemned as usury any taking of money for the use of money. He
rejected this rationale as obsolete in the modem era, when the lending of money on interest was
"in no sense a privilege"; he also disagreed with Thomas M. Cooley, who similarly had found this
form of government price regulation difficult to defend on principle but who nevertheless took
the view (as summarized by Tiedeman) that "long acquiescence in such laws preclude[ed] an
inquiry into their constitutionality," a view that Tiedeman rejected. Id. at 352-53.
168. On the protective tariff, see id. § 93, at 292-94.
169. On anti-miscegenation laws, see 2 id. § 188, at 894-95. Tiedeman also condemned as
unconstitutional laws against polygamy, at least insofar as these laws violated the religious
freedom of Mormons. See id. § 189, at 897.
170. On laws prohibiting vices generally, see I id. § 60, at 179-87.
171. Tiedeman defined vice as "an inordinate, and hence immoral, gratification of one's
passions and desires," which primarily damages one's self. Id. at 180. So defined, vice was not a
trespass on the rights of others and therefore not a criminal act, subject legitimately to police
regulation. Crimes involved direct "trespasses upon rights," not the "secondary or consequential
damage to others" that might result from an individuals' indulgence in their own vices. Id. at
180-81.
172. Id. at 181. Although Tiedeman acknowledged that one person's addiction to vices, even
trivial ones, might be harmful to others in society, he regarded those evils as "indirect and
remote," not involving "trespasses upon rights." Indeed, such evils are "so remote that many
other causes co-operate to produce the result," making it "difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain
what is the controlling and real cause." Id. Tiedeman would apply to constitutional analysis a
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He acknowledged that his distinction between vice and crime "ha[d] not been
endorsed by the courts," but he continued to insist upon it "because the
adverse decisions have not convinced me that the distinction is unsound."
17 3
As far as Tiedeman's laissez-faire constitutionalism went, it nevertheless
fell short of protecting liberty rights as broadly as modem libertarian theory-
or a complete and consistent adherence to Spencer's Law of Equal
Freedom-would imply. Not even Tiedeman would restrict altogether the
state's power to enforce rules of morality; for although he advocated
decriminalization of vices per se, he nevertheless would allow government to
criminalize trade in a vice.174 Moreover, notwithstanding his generally broad
view of liberty of contract in the employment context, which generally left
matters such as hours and wages subject to bargaining between the parties,
free of government regulation, 175 Tiedeman did concede to the government
rule akin to the rule of proximate causation in tort law-a rule he regarded as "deduced from the
accumulated experience of ages, . . . a law of nature, immutable and invarying." Id. at 184. To
make acts criminal that did not result in trespasses upon others-acts that would not be actionable
in tort because the damages they caused were too remote-would be an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty, without due process of law, he argued. Id. Thus, for example, "[i]t cannot
be made a legal wrong for one to become intoxicated in the privacy of his own room," because
the person who becomes drunk in private "has committed no wrong, i.e., he has violated no ight,
and hence he cannot be punished" under Tiedeman's formulation. Id. at 184-85.
173. Id. at 5 10. One court nearly accepted Tiedeman's distinction between vice and crime:
In Ah Lim v. Territory of Washington, I Wash. 156 (1890), the Washington territorial court
considered the defendant's challenge to his conviction under a statute that prohibited the smoking
of opium. Although a majority of three out of five judges upheld the conviction as a legitimate
exercise of the government's power to control "the moral, mental, and physical condition of its
citizens," the dissenting judges maintained that the statute was void, as an impermissible exercise
of the police power, because it was "altogether too sweeping in its terms." ld. at 164, 174. By
prohibiting all smoking of opium, even when done only in private and harming directly only
one's own person, the statute was "an unwarranted infringement of individual rights," wrote one
of the dissenting judges. Id. at 173; see Mayer, Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 134-36.
174. No one can claim the right to make a trade in vice, Tiedeman maintained; "a business
may always be prohibited, whose object is to furnish means for the indulgence of a vicious
propensity or desire." 1 TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, § 122, at 509-10. According to him,
although fornication and gambling ought not to be punishable offenses, the state could prohibit
the keeping of houses of prostitution, the keeping of gambling houses, or the sale of lottery
tickets. Id. Tiedeman did not explain his position but simply asserted, "A business that panders
to vice may and should be strenuously prohibited, if possible." Id. at 508. Tiedeman's distinction
seems untenable: If personal indulgence in a vice involves (by definition) no trespass on the
rights of others, how can government legitimately use its police power (as formulated by
Tiedeman) to prohibit trade in the vice-i.e., business relationships that merely facilitate acts that
do not harm others? In drawing this peculiar distinction, Tiedeman certainly fell short of modern
libertarian arguments for the decriminalization of "victimless crimes."
175. As Tiedeman understood it, the constitutional guarantee of liberty of contract was
"intended to operate equally and impartially upon both employer and employee." Id. § 98, at 316.
Statutes which determined the hours of labor, either directly by prohibiting labor above a proscribed
maximum or indirectly by requiring extra compensation for overtime, violated the constitutional
liberty of contract of persons who were suijuris. Id. § 102, at 333-34. Tiedeman exempted children
the ability legitimately to regulate the labor contract in order to protect
workers' health and safety 176 and to protect against fraud.
Under a frue laissez-faire constitutionalism, the general right to liberty is
absolute and can be limited only by legitimate government actions protecting
persons from harmful trespasses on their rights; in other words, only by
enforcement of the no-harm principle. Thus, not only the laws cited by
Justice Holmes in his Lochner dissent would be held to be unconstitutional
deprivations of liberty, but most laws that fell within the traditional scope of
the police power-the protection of public health, safety, order, and morals-
would be found unconstitutional, too.
2. The Moderate Paradigm: A Presumption in Favor of Liberty
Liberty of contract, as actually protected by the courts in the early
twentieth century, did not fit the radical paradigm for the protection of liberty
rights that a true laissez-faire constitutionalism would imply. Rather, it
followed from a paradigm that was more moderate in at least two basic
respects. First, rather than protecting, in all its aspects, a general and absolute
right to liberty (limited only by the definitional constraints imposed on liberty
itself by the no-harm principle or Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom), the
courts protected liberty in a particular context-the freedom to make
contracts. Second, the courts protected that freedom under a standard that
permitted the government to limit it through various exercises of the police
power, within its traditional scope. That standard, in effect, created at most a
general presumption in favor of liberty that could be rebutted by a showing
that the law being challenged was a legitimate police power regulation.
from the general rule, because they were not sui juris; and he exempted government employees
because government, as a party to the contract, had the right to limit the hours of employment. Id. at
335, 338. But he applied the guarantee of liberty of contract equally to women, married or single, as
well as to mern--citing with approval the Illinois Supreme Court's recognition of women's contract
rights in Ritchie v. People, 155 N.E. 98 (Ill. 1895), discussed supra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text; see also 1 TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, § 102, at 336. Nor did he exempt from his general rule
"unwholesome employments"; in his view, the danger to the health of the employee from working
long hours, regardless the type of occupation, was not a constitutional justification for interference
with liberty of contract. Id. at 337-38. Tiedeman had a generally positive attitude toward labor
unions, regarding them as legitimate means of reducing the disparity in bargaining strength between
employer and employee-and therefore of helping to maintain a standard of wages and to control the
terms of the labor contract, consistent with liberty of contract. Id. § 114, at 419-24.
176. Tiedeman regarded as legitimate exercises of the police power regulations that were
"reasonable safeguards" of the health and safety of workers, provided the regulations were not in
opposition to "the old common law theory of the non-liability of the employer for injuries
sustained by the employee, either through accident or the carelessness or negligence of the
fellow-servant." Id. § 103, at 339; see also 2 id. § 147, at 736-49 (discussing the constitutionality
of regulations of "unwholesome and objectionable trades," and of the regulations of mines).
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The scope of the right protected by liberty of contract was given its
classic definition by Justice Peckham in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the 1897 case
that was the Supreme Court's first decision explicitly protecting the right. In
his opinion for the Court, Peckham described the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person,
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to
use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
177
Although quite broad, this liberty right was not unlimited; it was a
particular aspect of individuals' general right to liberty, constrained by
law: specifically, the freedom to use one's own faculties "in all lawful
ways" to earn a livelihood "by any lawful calling." Moreover, it pertained
to those lawful exercises of one's freedom that could be realized through
legally enforceable contracts that were "proper, necessary, and essential" to
one's purpose. The emphasis on contract meant that this liberty right was
necessarily subject to certain legal constraints, as Peckham recognized.
1 78
As the Illinois Supreme Court similarly had recognized in one of the
earliest liberty of contract decisions, Ritchie v. People, "the right to
contract may be subject to limitations growing out of the duties which the
individual owes to society, to the public, or the government."',
79
177. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
178. "[Ilt may be conceded," Peckham wrote, "that this right to contract in relation to persons
or property or to do business within the jurisdiction of the State may be regulated and sometimes
prohibited when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the State as contained in its
statutes ...." Id. at 591.
179. Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (Ill. 1895). The court then noted some of these
limitations: those "imposed by the obligation to so use one's own as not to injure another, by the
character of property as affected with a public interest or devoted to a public use, by the demands
of public policy or the necessity of protecting the public from fraud or injury, by the want of
capacity, by the needs of the necessitous borrower as against the demands of the extortionate
lender." Id. at 456. But, as the court added, "the power of the legislature to thus limit the right to
contract must rest upon some reasonable basis, and cannot be arbitrarily exercised." Id. Later in
the opinion, the Illinois court also noted that laws passed in pursuance of the police power "must
have some relation to the ends sought to be accomplished"-to the "comfort, safety, [and]
welfare of society"--and "cannot invade the rights of persons and property under the guise of a
mere police regulation, when it is not such in fact." Id. at 458.
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Liberty of contract was not absolute. Justice George Sutherland
explicitly acknowledged this in his opinion for the Court in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,'80 one of the most important liberty of contract decisions,
second only in fame and historical significance to Lochner itself.'81 "There is,
of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of contract," Justice Sutherland
wrote, noting that it was "subject to a great variety of restraints."'
8 2
Nevertheless, he immediately added, "freedom of contract is... the general
rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to
abridge it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional
circumstances."' 
8 3
In thus protecting the right by a "general rule forbidding legislative
interference with freedom of contract," 184 the Court in effect was applying
what some modem scholars have advocated as a general presumption in favor
of liberty. 185 It was a presumption that could be overcome, however, by a
court's finding that the law in question (the law being challenged as an
abridgement of the right to liberty of contract) was a legitimate exercise of
one of the many recognized functions of the police power. Courts during the
Lochner era generally did not accept the government's rationale for a
challenged law at face value. Rather, they followed what Justice Harlan had
identified in Mugler v. Kansas as the "solemn duty" of the courts, in
exercising judicial review, "to look at the substance of things"-that is, to
180. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560-01 (1923) (holding that a law fixing
minimum wages for women in the District of Columbia was an unconstitutional deprivation of
the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment). The Adkins case is more fully discussed in Part
II.A., infra.
181. Although not as famous as Lochner, Adkins is arguably the best-reasoned and most
paradigmatic liberty-of-contract decision. The author of the Court's majority opinion in Adkins,
Justice George Sutherland, has been regarded by many scholars as the most distinguished of the
so-called "Four Horsemen," the block of conservative justices on the Court in the 1920s and
1930s. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 178-99 (expanded ed. 1988). And as noted in supra text
accompanying note 1, it was the reversal of Adkins in the 1937 West Coast Hotel decision that
marked the end of the Court's protection of liberty of contract as a fundamental right.
182. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546. Among those "great variety of restraints" was the numerous
exceptions to the general rule of liberty that Sutherland identified as valid exercises of the police
power, discussed more fully in Part II, infra.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 554.
185. Randy Barnett has argued that courts ought to apply "a general Presumption of Liberty"
as a way to enforce both the Ninth Amendment's protection of unenumerated constitutional rights
and the "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. RANDY E, BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 259-69 (2004); Randy E.
Barnett, Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE
HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1, 10-19 (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1993);
Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988).
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critically examine whether a "statute purporting to have been enacted to
protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety" had "a real or
substantial relation to those objects" or instead was "a palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law."'
186
The test applied by the courts in protecting liberty of contract was
stated by Justice Peckham in his opinion for the Court in Lochner. The
basic inquiry was as follows:
Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power
of the State, or is it an unreasonable unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or
to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to
him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his
family?"
To answer this question, Peckham added, courts must apply a means-ends
test:
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote
degree to the public health [or some other legitimate exercise of the
police power] does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The
act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the
end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be
held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an
individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in
relation to his own labor.
188
Modem scholars are correct when they describe the test applied in
Lochner and other liberty of contract cases as one that distinguished valid,
or "reasonable," police power exercises from invalid, or "arbitrary,"
exercises of governmental power; but they err in assuming that the
distinction between "reasonable" and "arbitrary," as applied by the courts,
referred to the prohibition of "class legislation" under nineteenth-century
constitutional law.18 9  Rather, the distinction referred to the traditional
186. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
187. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
188. Id. at 57-58.
189. See GILLMAN, supra note 29, at 72-73 (arguing that arbitrary characterized "factional
politics" while reasonableness denoted "class-neutral policies that advanced a public purpose").
Ironically, the very example Gillman cites to illustrate his interpretation of this distinction-
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 611 (1887)--disproves his thesis. The Court upheld a Kansas
liquor prohibition law-a measure that, by singling out a particular industry, could be considered
special-interest or class legislation-because it regarded it as a valid use of the police power to
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scope of the police power as a protection of public health, safety, order, and
morality: "reasonable" laws fit within one or more of these traditional
categories, while "arbitrary" laws did not.' 90 The test applied by the old
Court has been aptly characterized by one modem scholar as a "moderate"
means-ends analysis' 9 -that is, a fairly rigorous rational basis review that
can be distinguished from both of the tests used by the modem Court in
substantive due process cases. 192
Both in the scope of the liberty interests that it guaranteed and in the
standard applied by the Court in reviewing challenged legislation,
therefore, the Court's protection of liberty of contract in the early twentieth
century fell short of Christopher Tiedeman's more stridently libertarian
jurisprudence, with its protection of all aspects of liberty and its strict
adherence to the sic utere maxim as an absolute definitional limitation on the
legitimate scope of the police power. Perhaps the most telling difference
between the moderate paradigm actually followed by the Court in its
protection of liberty of contract and the radical paradigm of a true laissez-faire
constitutionalism is the difference in the two paradigms' treatment of
"morals" legislation, such as bans on lotteries and other forms of gambling,
protect public health and morals. Moreover, the test as articulated by Justice Harlan in that case
explicitly asked whether the challenged law truly "protected the public health, the public morals,
or the public safety" and had a "real or substantial relation to those objects," not whether the law
was class-neutral.
190. As David Bernstein and Michael Phillips have shown, Gillman's thesis fails to account
for several significant Lochner era decisions upholding laws that would seem obvious pieces of
class legislation. They include Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (oleomargarine ban)
and Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (maximum-hours law for miners), as well as Lochner
itself. David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 18-24 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Revisionism]; PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 108.
191. PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 4, 164. Under a means-ends analysis, the Court upholds a
challenged law as constitutional "if it promotes some appropriate goal (the end) in a sufficiently
direct or effective way (the means)." Id. at 4. Noting that, as applied by the modem Court,
means-ends tests "vary considerably in their stringency"--ranging from "strict scrutiny" to the
weak "rational basis" test-Phillips characterizes the test applied by Justice Peckham in Lochner
as "fairly rigorous" rational basis review, in contrast with the weak substantive test implied by
Justice Holmes' dissent. Id. at 4, 164.
192. Id. at 192-93. The modem tests-on the one hand, the minimal rational-basis test used
by the Court in reviewing economic regulations; and, on the other, the strict-scrutiny test
requiring laws to be "necessary" to achieve a "compelling" government purpose, used by the
Court in reviewing laws restricting certain "preferred freedoms"-are discussed more fully in
Part III, infra. Phillips argues that the old Court "applied a smorgasbord of standards and
nonstandards when government action was challenged on due process grounds, but never to my
recollection did it require that laws restricting economic rights be 'necessary' to achieve a
'compelling' government purpose of anything of the kind." PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 192-93.
In this respect, he maintains that "the supposedly doctrinaire and extremist Lochner Court in fact
was considerably more moderate than its modem counterpart." Id. at 193.
[Vol. 36:2
Winter 2009] LIBERTY OF CONTRACT DURING LOCHNER ERA 263
Sunday-closing laws, and the regulation or prohibition of alcohol. The Court
during the Lochner era consistently upheld such laws as valid exercises of the
police power, under its traditional scope (which included protection of
morality as well as public health). 93 A true laissez-faire constitutionalism
would have regarded all such forms of legal paternalism as abuses of
governmental power and abridgement of fundamental liberties.
II. Liberty of Contract in its Heyday: The Scope of the Right
Another flaw in the orthodox view of liberty of contract is its myopic
conception of the scope of the right. Liberty of contract, as protected by the
courts in the early twentieth century, protected more than just economic
freedom in the context of the labor market. Rather, the freedom that it
protected included not just economic, but also important non-economic
aspects-aspects that are ignored today by most scholars because they do not
fit the caricature of liberty-of-contract jurisprudence as "laissez-faire
constitutionalism" put forward by the orthodox Holmesian view.
The scope of liberty of contract as described by Justice Peckham in
Allgeyer-freedom "in the enjoyment of all [one's] faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where [one] will[s]; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation ' 94-
was quite broad. Considering especially the status of contract in late
nineteenth-century American law, the freedom to enter into contracts for the
purposes mentioned by the Court in Allgeyer was tantamount to the legal
expression-through society's protection of contracts under positive law--of
the natural rights mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, of liberty and
of the pursuit of happiness. It is little wonder, then, that when he anticipated
liberty of contract in his dissent in The Slaughterhouse Cases, Justice Field
spoke of such things as "the right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful
193. Citing such decisions, David Bernstein persuasively argues that "liberty of contract was
consistently limited by the invocation of common law doctrines that restricted individual freedom
for the perceived social good." Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 190, at 46 n.255 (citing, inter
alia, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory smallpox
vaccination law), Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding federal law barring lottery
tickets from interstate commerce), Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896) (upholding a
Sunday law)). Michael Phillips discerns a similar pattern of deference when the old Court
considered measures aimed at promoting public morality. PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 48, 79
nn. 124-25 (citing, inter alia, Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700 (1914) (upholding a local option
law prohibiting sale of liquor within a county), Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (upholding
law requiring able-bodied men to work on public roads), Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S.
589 (1915) (upholding a ban on fraternities in state schools), Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623
(1912) (upholding a ban on billiard halls), Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905) (upholding a
law prohibiting gambling)).
194. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
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manner," "equality of rights in the lawful pursuits of life," and "the right of
free labor" as interchangeable concepts, all realizing in law "the natural and
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens" in a free society.'
95
A. The Right to Economic Liberty
The best-known aspect of the Supreme Court's protection of liberty of
contract as a fundamental right, under the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, was its use to declare unconstitutional such
regulations of business as legislation targeting minimum wages or maximum
hours.
Clearly, the most famous decision protecting freedom of labor was
Lochner, where the Court recognized the right of both employers and
employees to bargain over the terms of labor contracts-specifically with
regard to the hours of work-free of interference from the state. The
regulation of maximum hours at issue in Lochner was just one provision of
the New York Bakeshop Act of 1895, a bakery reform law that was strongly
supported by unionized bakers and bakeries.' 96  Justice Rufus Peckham's
opinion for the five-justice majority of the Court turned on the essential
question whether the provision regarding maximum hours in the Bakeshop
Act was "a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power" or
"an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference" with the parties'
liberty of contract. In holding that the law was the latter, and therefore was
unconstitutional, Peckham critically examined the state's claim that it was a
health law. In concluding that "the limit of the police power has been reached
and passed in this case," Peckham and the majority in Lochner found, with
ample justification, that there was "no reasonable foundation for holding this
[hours provision] to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard
195. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 97, 109-10 (1873) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
196. The Bakeshop Act was modeled on England's Bakehouse Regulation Act of 1863; most
of its provisions were sanitary regulations. The maximum-hours provision, in Section I of the
Act, prohibited employees in "biscuit, bread, or cake" bakeries from working "more than sixty
hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day." David E. Bernstein, The Story of
Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW STORIES 325, 328-34 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner]; PAUL
KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER v. NEw YORK 44-
59, 169-70 (1990). Bernstein's discussion of the case's historical background emphasizes the
conflict between unionized New York bakeries-which were staffed by bakers of German
descent, who came to dominate the bakers' union-and their smaller, non-unionized competitors,
such as Joseph Lochner's, in Utica, New York. Bernstein, Lochner, supra, at 329-31.
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the public health or the health of the individuals who are following the trade
of a baker."' 97
In reaching the conclusion that the hours provision of the Bakeshop Act
was not a valid health law, Justice Peckham and the majority found that it was
a "labor law" that did not fall within the established limits of the police
power.1 98  Thus it failed to overcome the general presumption in favor of
liberty of contract and, therefore, was "an illegal interference with the rights
of individuals, both employers and employees, to make contracts regarding
labor upon such terms as they think best, or which they may agree upon with
the other parties to such contracts." 199 Contrary to the assertion in Justice
Holmes' dissent,200 Peckham's opinion for the Court was not based, either
explicitly or implicitly, upon Herbert Spencer's Social Statics or any other
laissez-faire work, still less upon any particular "economic theory." Rather,
Peckham's opinion was grounded on well-established legal principles of
constitutional law, including the moderate means-ends analysis that the Court
201had adopted as its standard of review in substantive due process cases.
Although not as famous as Lochner, perhaps the best example of the
Court's use of substantive due process to protect economic liberty is the 1923
decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.20 2 At issue in Adkins was a federal
law, enacted by Congress pursuant to its power to legislate for the District of
Columbia, fixing minimum wages for women and children employed in the
203District. A majority of five justices held that the D.C. law was an
197. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905). Peckham explained that the law was not a
protection of the public health, for "[cilean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the
baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours per week." Id. at 57. Nor, he added, was the
hours provisions necessary to protect the health of bakers, emphasizing that baking was an ordinary
trade and that bakers were "in no sense wards of the State," "not equal in intelligence and capacity to
men in other trades or manual occupations, or... not able to assert their ights and care for themselves
without the protecting arm of the State, interfering with their independence of judgment and action."
Id.
198. Id. at 57.
199. Id. at 61.
200. Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
201. In contrast to Holmes's pithy dissent, the principal dissenting opinion in Lochner-authored
by Justice John Marshall Harlan, joined by two other justices-followed the same moderate means-
ends analysis used by the majority but reached a different conclusion, based on a more liberal reading
of the state's power to enact health laws. According to Harlan, the Court should only invalidate a
purported health or safety law if it had "no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law." Id. at 65-66 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
202. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
203. Rather than setting a fixed minimum wage for all jobs, as modem minimum-wage laws
do, the D.C. law created a three-member board that was authorized "to investigate and ascertain
the wages of women and minors in the different occupations in which are they employed." Id. at
539-40. The board then determined, for each type of occupation, the wage level it considered
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"unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within
the guarantees of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.,
20 4
The Court's opinion was written by Justice George Sutherland, whom
many scholars consider the most scholarly of the so-called "Four
Horsemen," the four conservative justices on the Court who would be
labeled with this epithet in the 1930s because of their perceived opposition
to the New Deal.20 5 Sutherland began by observing, "That the right to
contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual
protected by [the due process] clause is settled by the decisions of this court
and is no longer open to question." He added that "[w]ithin this liberty are
contracts of employment of labor" and that "[i]n making such contracts,
generally speaking, the parties have an equal right to obtain from each
other the best terms they can as a result of private bargaining., 20 6 Although
Sutherland conceded there was "no such thing as absolute freedom of
contract"-that it was "subject to a great variety of restraints"-he also
observed that "freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and
restraint the exception, and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it
can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances. 2 °7
After reviewing those exceptions and finding that the D.C. minimum-wage
law fit none of them, 208 Sutherland concluded that it was "simply and
adequate "to supply the necessary cost of living," for women workers, "to maintain them in good
health and to protect their morals." Id. at 540. The law was challenged by the Children's
Hospital, which employed "a large number of women in various capacities," some of whom
worked for wages below the minimum fixed by the board. Id. at 542. In a case joined to Adkins,
Ms. Willie Lyons, a twenty-one-year-old elevator operator employed by the Congress Hall Hotel
also challenged the law; she had lost her job after the board had determined that a woman in her
occupation could not be employed for less than twice what she had been paid. Id. at 543. Hadley
Arkes, poignantly summarizing the facts of the case, has observed how the law, "in its liberal
tenderness, in its concern to protect women, had brought about a situation in which women were
being replaced, in their jobs, by men." ARKES, supra note 27, at 13.
204. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545. Chief Justice Taft dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice
Sanford. Id. at 562-67. Justice Holmes wrote a separate dissent, id. at 567-71, while Justice
Brandeis did not participate. Id. at 562.
205. Sutherland had been nominated to the Court in 1922 by President Warren G. Harding.
The other three were Justices Willis Van Devanter, nominated in 1910 by President William H.
Taft, James C. McReynolds, nominated in 1914 by President Woodrow Wilson, and Pierce
Butler, also nominated in 1922 by President Harding. On the so-called "Four Horsemen"
generally, see WHITE, supra note 181, at 178-99; on Sutherland's jurisprudence, see ARKES,
supra note 27.
206. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545.
207. Id. at 546.
208. Id. at 546-54. Sutherland concluded that
[i]t is not a law dealing with any business charged with a public interest or with public
work, or to meet and tide over a temporary emergency. It has nothing to do with the
character, methods or periods of wage payments. It does not prescribe hours of labor or
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exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to adult women.., who are legally
as capable of contracting for themselves as men. 2°9 Sutherland continued,
[The law] forbids two parties having lawful capacity-under
penalties as to the employer-to freely contract with one another in
respect of the price for which one shall render service to the other in
a purely private employment where both are willing, perhaps
anxious, to agree, even though the consequence may be to oblige one
to surrender a desirable engagement and the other to dispense with
210the services of a desirable employee.
The law, in other words, unjustifiably deprived both the employer and the
employee of their constitutionally-protected freedom of contract.
Another kind of wage-fixing law also was held in 1923 to be an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of contract. In Charles WolffPacking
Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Court considered a Kansas law that
declared the fuel, clothing, and food preparation industries to be businesses
"affected with a public interest" and empowered a three-judge industrial court
to fix wages within those industries.21  By a unanimous decision in which
Holmes and Brandeis joined, the Court concluded that this attempt to fix
wages in businesses like the Wolff company deprived them of their "property
and liberty of contract without due process of law., 212 Acknowledging that
the category of businesses "affected with a public interest" had expanded well
beyond its common law origins, Chief Justice Taft in his opinion for the Court
maintained that "the circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business
with a public interest... must be such as to create a peculiarly close relation
between the public and those engaged in it" and "an affirmative obligation on
[the business's] part to be reasonable in dealing with the public. 21 3 Here, the
businesses subjected to the control of the Kansas industrial court were not
within these recognized categories; hence, when the industrial court fixed
wages in order to resolve disputes between employers and workers, it
deprived both parties of their liberty-of-contract rights.214
conditions under which labor is to be done. It is not for the protection of persons under
legal disability or for the prevention of fraud.
Id. at 554.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 554-55. Sutherland's description of the harmful effects of the law explicitly
referred to the Lyons case. Id. at 555 n.1.
211. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations.
212. Id. at 544.
213. Id. at 536.
214. Id. at 540.
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The Court's emphasis on equality of liberty of contract rights as between
employers and employees explains its controversial decisions in two other
Lochner era cases dealing with labor contracts. In Adair v. United States
215
and Coppage v. Kansas,216 the Court struck down laws outlawing so-called
"yellow-dog" contracts under which employees agreed not to join a union or
remain a union member while in the employer's employ. Notwithstanding
modem commentators' views that these two decisions were erroneous,
reflecting the anti-union bias that was prevalent at the time,2 7 Adair and
Coppage can be explained by the Court's emphasis on equality of liberty-of-
contract rights as between employers and employees. Writing the opinion for
the six-justice majority of the Court holding the federal statute in Adair to be
unconstitutional,218 Justice John Marshall Harlan emphasized that employers
had no less liberty of contract than did employees, and that this liberty
included the freedom of either party to set conditions:
[I]t is not within the functions of government-at least, in the
absence of contract between the parties-to compel any person, in
the course of his business and against his will to accept or retain the
personal services of another, or to compel any person, against his
will, to perform personal services for another. The right of a person
to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence,
the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person
offering to sell it. So the right of the employ6 to quit the service of
215. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a federal law prohibiting
interstate carriers from discriminating against union members in various ways).
216. Coopage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a Kansas statute forbidding yellow-
dog contracts).
217. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 140-41 (maintaining that both Adair and Coppage
were incorrectly decided, even under the liberty-of-contract paradigm, because unionism helped
alleviate unequal bargaining power between employers and employees: "Because unionism was
necessary to make freedom of contract meaningful .... a pro-union measure should not have
fallen on freedom-of-contract grounds."). As noted supra in Part II.B., laissez-faire writers such
as William Graham Sumner and Christopher Tiedeman generally supported the right of workers
to join labor unions, viewing unions as a kind of free-market solution to the problem of unequal
bargaining strength. As emphasized above, however, the Court's protection of liberty of contract
did not follow the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" paradigm and hence in many ways departed
from a consistently libertarian jurisprudential model.
218. The statute at issue in Adair made it a federal crime for a railroad or other common
carrier engaged in interstate transportation, or any of its officers or agents, to require any
employee or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into
any agreement not to become or remain a member of any labor organization. Adair, 208 U.S. at
167. It also made it criminal for such employers to threaten any employee with loss of
employment or to discriminate against any employee because of his membership in a labor
organization. Id. at 168-69. Justices McKenna and Holmes wrote separate dissents. Id. at 180-
91. Justice Moody did not participate in the decision of this case. Id. at 180.
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the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such
employ6.1
19
"In all such particulars," Harlan stressed, "the employer and the employ6 have
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land."22
The two cases illustrate another important aspect of economic freedom
protected by the Court's liberty-of-contract jurisprudence, freedom of dealing,
based upon the common law right of refusal to deal. Thomas M. Cooley, in
his nineteenth-century treatise on tort law, described the right in this way:
It is a part of every man's civil rights that he be left at liberty to
refuse business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the
refusal rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice,
or malice. With his reasons neither the public nor third persons have
any legal concern. It is also his right to have business relations with
any one with whom he can make contracts, and if he is wrongfully
deprived of this right by others, he is entitled to redress.
221
In early twentieth-century American law, the right of refusal to deal was
subject to few restrictions outside of antitrust legislation; further restrictions,
in the form of unfair trade practices legislation and, ironically, "civil rights"
legislation (such as anti-discrimination statutes), had not yet curtailed this
broad common-law right.222
Finally, another important aspect of economic freedom protected by the
Court's liberty-of-contract jurisprudence was one's freedom of entry into
lawful trades or occupations. This aspect of liberty of contract had a very old
history, which may be traced back to the seventeenth-century writings of Sir
Edward Coke and other precedents in English law, going as far back as
219. Id. at 174-75.
220. Id. at 175.
221. Id. at 173 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 278 (1879)).
222. Since the enactment of modem antitrust and unfair competition statutes, the law
generally distinguishes individual refusals to deal-which are still considered "privileged," or
part of one's general freedom of contract-and concerted refusals, which may be actionable as
either antitrust violations or "unfair" methods of competition. Nevertheless, the general common
law right of an individual to refuse to engage in business with another person for any reason has
been abrogated by a number of statutes, including antidiscrimination laws such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1974) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in
public accommodation). See generally EDWARD W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 364-66 (5th ed. 1998).
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Magna Carta. Indeed, long before the Supreme Court protected liberty of
contract through the Fourteenth Amendment, American courts had protected
the common law right of an individual to pursue a gainful occupation, against
various efforts by the government to encroach on this right.23
Because the Court did not follow a true laissez-faire constitutionalism, it
did not protect the right to enter a market-that is, freedom to compete-
absolutely. Indeed, the Court during the Lochner era sustained a wide variety
of laws restricting entry into a lawful profession, business, trade, or calling-
typically, occupational licensing laws that were justified as protections of
public health or safety or as protections against fraud. 1 4 In several significant
decisions, however, the Court found that laws restricting entry into particular
markets were invalid, as "arbitrary" exercises of the police power that
225abridged the freedom to compete,
B. Other Facets of Liberty
Given the orthodox view's close association of the Supreme Court's
liberty-of-contract jurisprudence with cases like Lochner, modem students of
constitutional law often do not realize that liberty of contract had important
aspects outside the realm of labor or business regulation. Among the
frequently overlooked aspects of the right were its use to protect aspects of
individual autonomy that today are known as the "right to privacy," as well as
its use to combat de jure segregation in the form of so-called "Jim Crow"
laws.
Despite the popular assumption that the Court's protection of privacy as
a fundamental right began with Griswold v. Connecticut,226 some scholars
have recognized that-long before the Griswold Court attempted to derive
223. See Timothy Sandefur, The Right To Earn a Living, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 207, 207-27
(2003); Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82
KY. L.J. 397, 399-400 (1993-1994).
224. See PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 52 (concluding that "the old Court almost always upheld
occupational licensing laws," but was "much tougher on other kinds of entry restrictions").
225. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana law banning
insurance sales by companies not licensed to do business in Louisiana); Adams v. Tanner, 244
U.S. 590 (1917) (invalidating a Washington state law that prevented employment agencies from
collecting fees for their services); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (striking
down a Pennsylvania law essentially requiring that every pharmacy or drug store be wholly owned
by a licensed pharmacist or pharmacists); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
(invalidating an Oklahoma statute restricting entry into the ice business, which the Court deemed to be
"an ordinary business... essentially private in its nature," and therefore not a business "charged with
a public use," as the state had claimed).
226. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down an 1897 statute prohibiting
the use of any drug or device to prevent conception and prohibiting any person from advising or
providing contraceptive materials, as an unconstitutional interference with the "right of privacy"
of married couples and their physicians).
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privacy rights from the "penumbras" that emanated from particular Bill of
Rights guarantees227 -the Court during the Lochner era had protected what
today is regarded as an important aspect of privacy, so-called "parental
rights." As one scholar has observed, "[t]he right to privacy achieved
constitutional status in two cases of the Lochner era, the only substantive due
process decisions that survived the 1937 revolution. ' 228  The two cases
referred to were the so-called "school cases" from the 1920s, Meyer v.
Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.229 Although these two cases are
still frequently cited today as the earliest precedents for the right of privacy-
and particularly for protecting the freedom of parents to determine the
upbringing and education of their children-the modem reconceptualization
of Meyer and Pierce as "privacy" cases distorts their true nature as liberty-of-
contract decisions.
Meyer concerned one of the United States' first "English-only" laws, a
statute passed by the Nebraska legislature that prohibited teaching children
who had not yet passed the eighth grade in any language other than English.
It was passed following World War I, during a time when anti-German
prejudice was at its height in America, and targeted Nebraska's large German-
speaking immigrant population. 230  The plaintiff in error, Meyer, was a
teacher in a parochial school who had been convicted of violating the statute
by teaching the subject of reading in the German language to a ten-year-old
boy. Writing the opinion for a near-unanimous Court, Justice James C.
McReynolds-ironically, the justice who has the reputation of being the
Lochner-era Court's worst "reactionary"2 3 '-described the liberty guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment in broad terms:
227. Justice Douglas's opinion for the majority of the Court grounded the right of privacy in
various "penumbras, formed by emanations" from certain Bill of Rights guarantees, in order to
avoid basing the right directly on substantive due process protection of liberty, as the Court had
done during the Lochner era. See id. at 484.
228. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE
177-78 (1988).
229. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Each case was "an easy one, striking down
indefensible legislation," William Wiecek asserts. WIECEK, supra note 228, at 178. Nevertheless, the
statutes at issue in the cases seem "indefensible" only to modem-day eyes; at the time, it could be
argued, they were the kind of laws "purporting to advance public morality and communal solidarity"
that the old Court tended to uphold, unless they conflicted with liberty-of-contract rights. See
PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 48.
230. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATWISM, EDUCATION, AND
THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 133 (1994).
231. In addition to being, in the words of one modem scholar, "the New Deal's most
implacable foe on the Supreme Court," McReynolds has been described by a friendly biographer
as a man who "'discriminated against blacks, patronized women, and disliked Jews."' PHILLIPS,
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
232
He then held that both Mr. Meyer's "right... to teach" the German language
and "the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children" were
within the liberty protected by the Amendment and were abridged by the
statute.
233
The law at issue in Pierce was also the product of bigotry. The
Compulsory Education Act passed by the Oregon legislature in 1922 required
all children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools;
passed at the insistence of the Ku Klux Klan, the law aimed to eliminate
private and parochial schools in the state.234 The owners of two schools-the
Society of Sisters, a Roman Catholic charitable group, and Hill Military
Academy, a private, for-profit boys' military school-brought suit to enjoin
enforcement of the law.235 Affirming the lower court's grant of a preliminary
injunction, the Court-in another opinion written by Justice McReynolds-
followed "the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska" in holding that the Oregon law
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control. 236 McReynolds
then added a stridently libertarian statement that is often quoted in modem
case law as a broad explanation of parents' rights to control their children's
education:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
supra note 32, at 48 (quoting JAMES EDWARD BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE JAMES
CLARK MCREYNOLDS 135 (1992)).
232. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
233. Id. at 400. McReynolds also found that the Nebraska law was an unconstitutional
attempt "materially to interfere with the calling of modem language teachers," as well as with the
"opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge" and "the power of parents to control the education
of their own." Id. at 401.
234. On the Klan's influence, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
415-19 (2002).
235. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 529-33
(1925).
236. Id. at 534-35.
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standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.
What is often omitted from modem summaries of the decision, however,
is McReynolds' explanation for the Court's holding, afflrming the injunction
that had been sought by the schools, barring enforcement of the law. The
plaintiffs, Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, were "threatened
with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which [the state of
Oregon was] exercising over present and prospective patrons of their
schools," the Court found; thus the injunction was properly issued to prevent
irreparable injury and to protect the plaintiffs against "arbitrary, unreasonable
and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of
their business and property.
238
Finally, the Supreme Court's 1917 decision in Buchanan v. Warley
2 39
illustrates yet another noteworthy episode in the history of the Court's
protection of liberty of contract-one that is forgotten, or overlooked, because
it does not accord with the caricature of laissez-faire constitutionalism
presented by most legal historians and constitutional scholars. 24°  In
Buchanan, the Court used the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to declare unconstitutional a Louisville, Kentucky ordinance
mandating racial segregation in housing.24 1  At the time, with Plessy v.
237. Id. at 535.
238. Id. at 535-36.
239. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
240. For example, one history of American law cites Buchanan erroneously as a case decided
"on equal-protection grounds" and discusses the case only in the context of the NAACP
campaign of litigation that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
HALL, supra note 9, at 264-65. Other scholars-see, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 157-58-
omit the case from their lists of liberty-of-contract decisions because they regard it as a "property
rights" case, although the right to acquire or dispose of property that was involved in the case was
a right also to enter into a contract for its sale.
241. As summarized by Justice Day, the ordinance prohibited persons of color from moving
into or occupying "any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are
occupied as residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by white people than are
occupied ... by colored people." Id. at 70-71. In short, as Justice Day succinctly characterized
the ordinance,
This interdiction is based wholly upon color; simply that and nothing more. In effect,
premises situated as are those in question in the so-called white block are effectively
debarred from sale to persons of color, because if sold they cannot be occupied by the
purchaser nor by him sold to another of the same color.
Id. at 73. The historical background of the Louisville ordinance and of the case (which was a test
case brought by William Warley, an active African-American member of the Louisville NAACP)
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Ferguson242 as the controlling decision, the equal protection clause did not
prohibit such de jure segregation and so, on equal protection grounds, the
Court typically upheld such "Jim Crow" or mandatory segregation laws. As
Justice William R. Day noted in his opinion for the unanimous Court,243
however, the equal protection clause was not the only provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment that limited the police power of the states:
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in
question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the
police power of the State, and is in direct violation of the
fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution preventinf state interference with property rights except
by due process of law.
In thus affirming the due process clause's protection of individual rights,
Justice Day also explicitly rejected all the police power rationales that
Kentucky had argued in support of state-enforced segregation, including the
state's overtly racist justification that the segregation law promoted the
"maintenance of the purity of the races., 245 In rejecting these arguments, the
Court declined to broaden the scope of police power beyond its traditional
bounds, holding that none of the state's justifications for the segregation law
legitimately trumped the basic individual right at issue in the case: "the civil
right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a
person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white
are ably discussed in David Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v.
Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VANDERBILT L. REV. 797, 839-56 (1998).
242. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana law requiring separate
railway carriages for white and black persons, as a "reasonable regulation" not in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). As summarized by Justice Day,
segregation per se did not violate the equal protection clause under the principle of Plessy because
"[racial] classification of accommodation was permitted upon the basis of equality for both
races." Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79.
243. Justice Holmes drafted a dissent in Buchanan that he ultimately chose not to deliver.
See Bernstein, supra note 241, at 855.
244. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 82. "Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns,"
Justice Day declared. Id. at 74. "It includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it"-which
also entailed (although he did not explicitly say so) the freedom to enter into contracts for that
purpose. Id. at 74.
245. Id. at 81. Other police power rationales argued by Kentucky were that the law would
promote the public peace by preventing race conflict and that the law was necessary to prevent
the depreciation in the value of property owned by white people when black persons became their
neighbors. Id. at 80-82; see also Bernstein, supra note 241, at 844-45, 847-50 (discussing the
overtly racist arguments in Kentucky's briefs), 853-84 (summarizing Justice Day's disposition of
the state's police power arguments).
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person.''246 As some modem scholars have suggested, a full appreciation for
the significance of Buchanan sheds new light on both Lochner-era
jurisprudence and the increasingly influential Progressive movement that was
challenging it in the early twentieth century.247
III. The Demise of Liberty of Contract
The mythology that historians and constitutional scholars have created to
support the orthodox view of Lochner-era jurisprudence also includes the
story most frequently told to explain the demise of liberty of contract. That
story, at the heart of the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" caricature, is that the
right supposedly invented by "activist" judges in 1897 was killed forty years
later by a different group of judges, who atoned for their jurisprudential sins
by accepting social "reality"-the reality, that is, of the twentieth-century
regulatory state.248 What really doomed liberty of contract, however, was not
judicial acceptance of "reality," as the Legal Realists have argued. Rather, it
was doomed because of jurisprudential weaknesses in the doctrine itself, as it
was applied by the courts. And the judges who overturned Lochner-era
jurisprudence were not following "neutral principles" of constitutional
adjudication; they were, in fact, judicial activists who abdicated their twin
duties, of enforcing constitutional limits on government power and protecting
the fundamental rights of individuals, in order to advance the New Deal
policy agenda.
A. Cracks in the Foundation: The Failure of Lochner-Era Jurisprudence
The coalescence of several factors explains why the Supreme Court's
protection of liberty of contract as a fundamental constitutional right was so
246. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 81. Justice Day also held that the Fourteenth Amendment
operated "to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without state legislation
discriminating against him solely because of color." Id. at 79.
247. See Bernstein, supra note 241, at 858, 870-71 (maintaining that Buchanan caused the
end of explicit dejure residential segregation in the United States and may be credited with helping
save the country, or at least the South, from instituting South African-style apartheid); see also James
W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VANDERBILT L.
REv. 953, 972 (1998) (maintaining that Buchanan shows that the Court's substantive due process
protection of individual liberty and property rights "often safeguarded the interests of vulnerable and
powerless segments of society," against the efforts of the so-called "Progressive" reformers who were
advocating not only segregation laws and laws that would "protect" women out of their jobs, but also
a wide variety of new forms of legal restrictions on both economic and personal freedoms-all in the
name of protecting "public welfare").
248. See, e.g., Woodard, supra note 26, at 305-11 (explaining the demise of the supposedly
laissez-faire standard in terms of"a clash with reality," the reality of an industrial society).
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short-lived. These factors included the changing membership of the Court,24 9
as well as significant changes in the law, both in constitutional law principles
and in theories of jurisprudence, during the first few decades of the twentieth
century. 250 By far the most important factor, however, was the standard of
review used by the justices to protect liberty of contract: the moderate
paradigm for the protection of liberty, with its moderately stringent means-
ends analysis, as discussed in Part I.C., supra. Because liberty of contract in
practice-as actually protected by the Supreme Court-was nothing more
than a general presumption in favor of liberty, it was a right that was
apparently riddled with exceptions. The broad categories of "exceptions to
the general rule forbidding legislative interference with freedom of contract"
that Justice Sutherland identified in Adkins shows how far-reaching those
"exceptions" were.251
One of those categories-which proved to be especially troublesome for
Sutherland in Adkins-was that of statutes fixing the hours of labor. Both
before and after the Lochner decision-with its decisions in Holden v. Hardy
(1898)252 and Muller v. Oregon (1 908)253-the Court had upheld maximum-
hours laws that restricted the freedom of contract of particular classes of
workers, namely workers in extraordinarily dangerous occupations and
women workers, as valid exercises of the police power to protect health, even
though these laws involved the health of those particular classes of workers
rather than the health of the general public. The line that the Court apparently
had drawn in Lochner, preserving liberty-of-contract rights for male workers
249. Noting how changes in the membership of the Supreme Court affected its substantive due
process review of legislation, some scholars have suggested that the so-called "Lochner era" really
consisted of three different eras: an early period of moderate development (1897-1911), a middle
period of essentially no development (1911-1923), and a final period of expansion of the doctrine
(1923 to mid-1930s). See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N. C. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1991); Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 190,
at 10-11.
250. One of the most important changes in American legal culture in the early twentieth
century was the shift from "formalism" to "realism" in the law. On this shift, see generally
Hovenkamp, supra note 34, at 381-82; Mayer, Tiedeman, supra note 35, at 151-52. A second
important change in legal culture was the fundamental shift in the definition of the police power
after publication of an influential new treatise, written by Ernst Freund, in the early years of the
twentieth century. Freund defined the police power as "the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, at iii (1904). Not surprisingly, Progressive
reformers who championed social legislation in the early twentieth century embraced Freund's new,
elastic conception of the police power, with its amorphous "public welfare" rationale.
251. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546-54 (1923).
252. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding a Utah law that limited the hours of
workmen in underground mines, as well as in smelting and other operations).
253. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a state statute limiting the hours of
women employed in factories to ten hours a day).
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in ordinary trades, appears to have virtually vanished in the Court's decision
in a 1917 case, Bunting v. Oregon,254 a decision that many commentators
have seen as effectively overruling Lochner.255  Bunting signaled that a
majority of the justices, during the period between the two world wars, were
unwilling to question any exercises of the police power that seemed to protect
workers' health-even if legislation effectively barred certain classes of
persons from particular occupations.256
Police-power regulations protecting health or safety consisted of a broad
category of exceptions to the general rule of liberty of contract, or personal
freedom generally, that extended far beyond the cases upholding hours laws
listed by Sutherland in his Adkins opinion. It was under the rationale of
protecting public health that the Court had upheld a Massachusetts law
compelling citizens to be vaccinated against smallpox.257 Moreover, in
another important line of cases concerning workers' health, safety, and
welfare-cases often overlooked in standard treatments of the Lochner era-
the Court upheld workers' compensation laws and other measures regulating
211recovery for on-the-job injuies.
Another, and the perhaps most important, category of exceptions listed
by Justice Sutherland in Adkins was that of businesses "affected with a public
interest." The Court in its decision in Wolff Packing (1923) had tried to
254. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding as a valid health law an Oregon
statute that prohibited the employment of anyone-except watchmen or employees engaged in
emergency repairs-in a mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment, for more than ten hours a day,
unless the employer paid time-and-a-half for extra hours).
255. Both Chief Justice Taft and Justice Holmes, in their dissents in Adkins, maintained that
Lochner had been overruled by Bunting. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 564 (Taft, C.J., dissenting)
(writing that he found it "impossible" to reconcile Bunting with Lochner and adding that he had
"always supposed that the Lochner case was thus overruled sub silento"); id. at 570 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (writing that he thought Lochner "would be allowed a deserved repose"). Many
modem scholars agree; see, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 9, at 103 (maintaining that Bunting "buried
Lochner without even citing it").
256. Indeed, just one year after Adkins, the Court upheld a law banning night work for women,
under the rationale that women have weaker constitutions than have men. Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292, 293-95 (1924) (following the Muller Court's recognition of "the physical limitations of
women").
257. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).
258. E.g., Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (upholding federal law
governing railroads' liability for the employees' on-the-job injuries); Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911) (upholding state law similarly governing railroads'
liability for employees' injuries), N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountain
Timber v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (rejecting substantive due process challenges to
workers' compensation laws for hazardous employments). This line of cases is nicely
summarized by Michael Phillips, who concludes that the Court during the Lochner era "in all, ....
probably rejected eighteen substantive due process attacks on workers' compensation provisions
and kindred laws." PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 54-55.
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articulate a clear standard to determine whether a business truly was affected
with a public interest and therefore subject to government regulation, even of
the price terms of its contracts. Applying the standard, the Court in a series of
opinions written by Justice Sutherland in the late 1920s struck down laws
fixing maximum prices for services or commodities sold to the public,
holding that the businesses involved in those cases were not affected with a
public interest.259 Although the Court would continue to enforce limits
defining businesses "affected with a public interest," striking down the market
entry restrictions in New State Ice (1932)-with Sutherland again writing the
Court's opinion---changes in the membership of the Court helped pave the
way for abandonment of the doctrine altogether.26° In Nebbia v. New York,261
a bare majority of five justices upheld a Depression-era New York statute that
created a state Milk Control Board with authority to fix minimum prices for
the retail sale of milk. One of the Court's newest justices, Owen Roberts,
wrote the opinion for the majority, declaring that "there is no closed class or
category of businesses affected with a public interest"; virtually any business
could be "subject to control for the public good," with the state regulating any
aspect of the business, "including the prices to be charged for the products or
commodities it sells. 262 Moreover, Roberts' opinion for the Court seemed to
announce a new standard of review in substantive due process cases, at least
those involving government regulation of business-a standard that seemed to
turn on its head the general presumption in favor of liberty:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose.... Price control, like any other form of regulation, is
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty.
263
259. See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (resale of theater tickets); Ribnik
v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (employment agency fees); Williams v. Standard Oil, 278 U.S.
235 (1929) (retail price of gasoline).
260. Chief Justice Taft was succeeded by Charles Evans Hughes in 1930. In the same year,
Justice Sanford was succeeded by Owen J. Roberts. Two years later, in 1932, Justice Holmes
was succeeded by Benjamin Cardozo.
261. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The law was designed to help protect the
state's dairy farmers from the spiraling fall in milk prices. Id. at 518 n.2.
262. Id. at 536-57.
263. Id. at 537-39.
[Vol. 36:2
Winter 2009] LIBERTY OF CONTRACT DURING LOCHNER ERA
Thus, with the Nebbia decision in the mid-1930s, the "public interest"
category proved to be the proverbial exception that swallowed up the rule.
One additional broad category of cases, not cited in Sutherland's
Adkins opinion, also deserve mention. These are decisions that involved
exercises of police power that, as seen by the Court, fit within the
traditional exercises of the police power for the protection of public
morality. As noted in Part I.C. above, one of the critically important ways
in which the Court's protection of liberty of contract can be distinguished
from a true laissez-faire constitutionalism is its general tolerance for
paternalistic legislation, particularly where morals were concerned. Thus,
as one modem scholar has summed it up, "liberty of contract was
consistently limited by the invocation of common law doctrines that
restricted individual freedom for the perceived social good," with the Court
upholding such laws as bans on lotteries and other forms of gambling,
Sunday-closing laws, and laws regulating and even prohibiting alcohol
consumption.26
With liberty of contract resting on such shaky jurisprudential grounds,
it perhaps should not be surprising that the Supreme Court's protection of
liberty of contract was a relatively minor part of its early twentieth-century
constitutional jurisprudence and that the Court upheld many more state laws
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment than it struck down.265 One
modem scholar who has done a quantitative analysis of Lochner-era
decisions, focused on the Court's substantive due process review of social and
economic regulations during the 1897-1937 period, has concluded that
liberty-of-contract decisions "were simply one category of substantive due
process decision-and not the numerically most significant category
either.
266
264. Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 190, at 46 & n.255.
265. The Progressive historian Charles Warren did a crude empirical study of Supreme Court
decisions in the years 1887-1911 that found, out of over 560 decisions based on the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court invalidated only a handful
of state statutes that he called "social justice legislation." See Charles Warren, The
Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUMBIA L. REV. 294, 295 (1913); see
also 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 463-78 (1923).
Another important study, still cited today, by Felix Frankfurter identified 220 decisions from the
1897-1938 period that invalidated state laws on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. FELIX
FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 97-137 (1938) (appendix
listing and describing "Cases Holding State Action Invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment").
These sources, and others, are nicely summarized in PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 32-35, 62 n. 1.
266. Phillips, supra note 32, at 5. Phillips reduces Frankfurter's list of 220 cases down to 128
cases by eliminating cases decided on privileges and immunities, equal protection, and procedural
due process grounds. Id. at 35-36. After making some further adjustments to the list and then
deleting what he classifies as "peripheral" and "borderline" substantive due process cases, id. at
36-40, he arrives at a list of only fifty-six "core" substantive due process cases. Id. at 41-58, 86-
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Nor should it be surprising that the Court ceased protecting so fragile
a fight as liberty of contract as a fundamental fight by the late 1930s. Near
the end of his Adkins opinion, Justice Sutherland again stressed that "[t]he
liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not
absolute." He added that liberty "must frequently yield to the common
good, and the line beyond which the power of interference may not be
pressed is neither definite nor unalterable but may be made to move, within
limits not well-defined, and with changing need and circumstance., 267 The
so-called "New Deal Revolution" marked the Court's redrawing of that line
in response to changed political, as well as jurisprudential, circumstances.
B. A New Paradigm: The "New Deal Revolution" of 1937
For the past seventy years, scholars have recognized the significance of
the so-called "New Deal revolution" of 1937.268 The shift that occurred,
apparently so suddenly and dramatically in the spring of 1937, with a series of
five-to-four decisions (in which both Chief Justice Hughes and Justice
Roberts joined the majority2 6 9 ) upholding New Deal legislation,2 70 was
87 n.2 10. Of these fifty-six, he identifies only ten cases as liberty-of-contract decisions; i.e.,
those in which the Court "used express freedom-of-contract reasoning to strike down government
action." Id. at 35-58, 86-87 n.2 10. Phillips' classification is far too restrictive, however; it omits
many significant liberty-of-contract decisions-for example, Meyers and Pierce, which he
classifies as cases involving "personal rights," id. at 48, and Buchanan, which he classifies as a
"land-use" case. Id. at 46-47, 157-58.
267. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
268. It is commonplace for historians and constitutional scholars to describe 1937 as a
constitutional "revolution" and to associate the Supreme Court's apparently sudden reversal that
year as a reaction to President Roosevelt's infamous plan to "pack" the Court-the famous
"switch in time that saved nine." See, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE BLESSINGS OF
LIBERTY: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 280-82 (2d ed.
2006); HALL, supra note 9, at 281-82. Bruce Ackerman has described the New Deal Revolution
as one of the "three great turning points of constitutional history"; like the other two turning
points he identifies-the Founding and Reconstruction-it involved "a total repudiation of the
preexisting constitutional tradition and its replacement.., with a new comprehensive synthesis."
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 58, 114 (1991).
269. It should be noted that Justice Roberts was author of the majority opinion in the 1934
decision of Nebbia; Chief Justice Hughes was author of the majority opinions in Home Building
& Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding Minnesota debt moratorium law against an
Article 1, Section 10 contracts clause challenge) and Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288 (1936) (upholding the constitutionality of the TVA as an exercise of Congress's power,
under Article IV, Section 3, "to disposeof and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"). Both decisions suggest that the
1937 "switch" was neither sudden nor unpredictable. Indeed, Barry Cushman has argued
plausibly that Nebbia marks the Court's abandonment of its Lochner-era jurisprudence. See
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 7 (1998).
270. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a Washington state minimum
wage law); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937)
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twofold. First, with regard to the scope of federal power, the Court
abandoned its previous holdings limiting Congress's powers, in effect
eviscerating the Tenth Amendment as a fundamental rule of interpretation.27'
Second, with regard to limitations on both state and federal legislative powers
through substantive use of the due process clause, the Court abandoned its
protection of liberty of contract as a fundamental right, in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish;272 and a year later, in Carolene Products v. United States,273 it
adopted the minimal "rational basis" test for economic legislation,274 a test
that in the eyes of many commentators established a "double standard" in
modem constitutional law, affording less protection for property rights and
economic liberty than for other, non-economic rights.
275
Although obviously it is only the second aspect of the New Deal
revolution that is directly relevant here, both aspects are interrelated and
illustrate the fundamental nature of the Court's shift. Under the guise of
judicial restraint, the majority of the justices on the Court-reflecting their
own policy preferences in favor the New Deal--discarded long-established
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding the NLRA as applied to a small
manufacturer with only a negligible effect upon interstate commerce); Associated Press v. Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (upholding the NLRA as applied to the labor relations
of newspapers and press associations); Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
(upholding the Social Security Act's unemployment excise tax upon employers); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act's old-age tax and benefit
provisions).
271. On this profound shift in the Court's reading of the Tenth Amendment, see David N.
Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment,
25 CAPITAL U. L. REv. 339, 379-86 (1996).
272. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 397 (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital and
upholding legislation setting minimum wages and/or maximum hours as reasonable exercises of
the police power, not violating the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
As legal historian James Ely notes, the decision in West Coast Hotel "effectively repudiated the
liberty of contract doctrine" as well as "marked the virtual end of economic due process as a
constitutional norm." ELY, supra note 40, at 127.
273. Carolene Prod. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (rejecting a due process challenge
to a federal law prohibiting interstate shipment of "filled" milk). The most famous part of Justice
Stone's opinion for the majority of the Court in Carolene Products is his footnote 4--called by
Professor Ackerman "the most famous [footnote] in Supreme Court history." ACKERMAN, supra
note 268, at 119.
274. Footnote 4 in Carolene Products suggested a standard of review with "more exacting
judicial scrutiny" for legislation falling within "a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten Amendments," or for legislation disadvantaging "discrete and insular
minorities," or obstructing "political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation." Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. As Professor Currie
notes, Justice Stone's footnote "established the Court's agenda for the next fifty years." CURRIE,
supra note 9, at 244.
275. On the constitutional double standard, see ELY, supra note 40, at 133; SIEGAN, supra note
63, at 41-42; PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 185-92.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
constitutional precedents in order to uphold the validity of the modem
regulatory and welfare state. For example, Chief Justice Hughes's opinion for
the Court in West Coast Hotel was replete with assumptions about the "evils
of the 'sweating system' and policy arguments in favor of minimum wage
laws.276 In his dissenting opinion in the case, Justice Sutherland argued that
the meaning of the Constitution "does not change with the ebb and flow of
economic events" and criticized the majority for amending the Constitution
"under the guise of interpretation., 277
Contrary to the orthodox story about Lochner-era jurisprudence, it seems
that the dissenting justices in 1937-who had supported the Court's
protection of liberty of contract-were adhering to "neutral principles" in
constitutional adjudication; the new majority, comprised of the Court's
"liberal" justices, now joined by the moderate "swing" votes of Hughes and
Roberts, seem to be the judicial activists. Indeed, notwithstanding the
prevalent view that judicial restraint is neutral,278 it is not the result of a
decision-whether the court strikes down a law as unconstitutional or upholds
it against a constitutional challenge-that determines whether or not it is
activist; as discussed in Part I.C., supra, judges can be just as activist in
deferring to the legislature, or upholding legislation against constitutional
challenge, as they can be in exercising judicial review. What makes a
decision activist is the reasoning used by the judge in support of the decision.
Hughes' reasoning in support of the Washington minimum-wage statute at
issue in West Coast Hotel was based on policy arguments; it better fit the
stereotype created by Holmes' dissent in Lochner-a case decided upon
"economic theory"-than did Lochner, Adkins, or any of the Court's other
276. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398-99. Hughes wrote: "The exploitation of a class of
workers who are in an unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively
defenseless against the denial of a living wage... casts a direct burden for their support upon the
community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon to pay .... The
community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers."
Id. at 399. As Richard Epstein has shown, the passage is replete not only with dubious policy
arguments but with unsound economic theories. Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 18-19 (1988). As many modem economists argue, minimum-wage
laws actually harm the very groups of persons they purportedly help. See generally GEORGE
REISMAN, CAPITALISM: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 382-84, 659-60 (1996) (explaining how
minimum-wage laws cause unemployment and create legal barriers to entry, or monopolize the
market, against the less able and the disadvantaged).
277. W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 402-04 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
278. E.g., EARL M. MALTZ, RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM,
INTERVENTIONISM, AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1994) ("[A] principle that the
Court should defer generally to legislative judgments has no obvious political bias and therefore
fits comfortably within the basic framework of neutral principles.").
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liberty-of-contract decisions.279 Indeed, one might argue that the notion that
the modem, post-1937 Court's "neutrality" on matters of economics in
constitutional adjudication is a myth-that the jurisprudential position taken
by modem liberal constitutionalists is definitely not neutral but rather is based




The orthodox view of the Supreme Court's protection of liberty of
contract during the Lochner era-the view that identifies it as "laissez-faire
constitutionalism"--is a myth, or perhaps more accurately, a folktale, the
equivalent in constitutional law of a modem urban legend.28' The folktale
was invented by early twentieth-century Progressive-movement scholars
282
and has been perpetuated by modem-day apologists for the twentieth-century
welfare/regulatory state. In each of its key parts, that folktale not only is
wrong but often turns the truth entirely on its head.
First and foremost, in protecting liberty of contract as a fundamental
right, the Court during the Lochner era was not applying a laissez-faire
political or economic philosophy-"enacting Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
279. Thus, rather than criticizing the old Court for protecting liberty of contract based on
"Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," it would be fairer to criticize the Court in 1937 for
abandoning liberty of contract based on, say, "Mr. Ernst Freund's Standards of American
Legislation" or one of the economics texts of Henry W. Farnam, for it was the reasoning of such
advocates of social legislation and government regulation of business as Freund and Famam that
the "liberal" justices of the 1930s seemed to be following. Indeed, one of Famam's books, The
Economic Utilization of History (1913), may have furnished the idea that "the states are
laboratories for social experiments," that Justice Brandeis pronounced in his famous dissent in
New State Ice Company. See McCurdy, supra note 37, at 189.
280. Michael Phillips discusses "The Myth of the Modem Court's Economic Neutrality,"
arguing persuasively that the post-1937 substantive due process jurisprudence embodied in the
opinions of Justices Black and Douglas has not been neutral in practice but rather has sanctioned
a particular political/economic theory. PHILLIPS, supra note 32, at 164. He describes that theory
as "corporativism: a fusion of public and private power in which large groups dominate society,
government serves their interests, and individuals count for relatively little as individuals." Id. at
164-65. He also follows Hadley Arkes in seeing corporativism as "the New Deal's main
economic philosophy." Id. at 167. Similarly, Richard Epstein has identified the economic policy
behind the Progressive movement and the New Deal as one based on government-created and
regulated cartels, in lieu of free, competitive markets. See EPSTEIN, supra note 139, at 77-100.
281. On the distinction between myths, on the one hand, and folktales or legends on the other,
see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF URBAN LEGENDS 111-13, 279 (Jan Harold Brunvand ed., 2001) (entries
on Definition of "Legend" and Myth).
282. How the Progressives "rewrote" American constitutional law-and, in the process,
unfairly caricatured the Supreme Court's liberty-of-contract jurisprudence-is nicely discussed in
Richard Epstein's book, aptly titled How the Progressives Rewrote the Constitution. EPSTEIN,
supra note 139.
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Statics," as Justice Holmes accused the majority of doing in Lochner. Rather
than following a "laissez-faire constitutionalism"--which would have
resulted in the overturning of literally hundreds of laws that the Court upheld
as valid exercises of the police power-the Court reviewed challenged laws
under a moderate means-ends test, which in effect created a general
presumption in favor of liberty. Through its liberty-of-contract jurisprudence,
the Court protected various aspects of liberty, including not only economic
freedom but also other aspects that today would be regarded as "personal"
freedom; and it protected not just the wealthy or powerful but also relatively
powerless individuals and members of minority groups. In protecting liberty
of contract, the Court nevertheless also continued to recognize the validity of
the police power in its traditional scope, as a protection of public health,
safety, and morals. Virtually every law that the Court invalidated as abridging
liberty of contract was a new kind of "social legislation," unprecedented and
inconsistent with the traditional scope of police powers. The Court, in short,
based its liberty-of-contract jurisprudence on well-established principles of
American constitutional law: the use of the due process clauses, substantively,
to protect property and liberty in all its dimensions, by enforcing certain
recognized limits on the states' police power, limits that had become
federalized with the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
Finally, it was not the Lochner-era Court that was guilty of "judicial
activism" in protecting liberty of contract. Its liberty-of-contract
jurisprudence adhered to "neutral principles" of constitutional decision
making. The activism came, rather, with the Court's abandonment of liberty
of contract as a fundamental right following the so-called "New Deal
revolution." That activism is evident today in the so-called "double standard"
that the modem Court applies in its substantive due process jurisprudence.
Certain "preferred freedoms"-including not only certain rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights such as First Amendment freedom of speech or religion
but also the unenumerated "right of privacy"-are more strongly protected
than are economic freedom or property rights, the rights stereotypically
associated with Lochner-era jurisprudence. The irony is that, among the
aspects of liberty protected today as privacy rights, are the last remaining
vestiges of the old Court's liberty-of-contract jurisprudence. Indeed, the great
untold story in American constitutional law today is the degree to which
modem protection of personal freedoms and civil liberties owes to the Court's
pre- 1937 protection of liberty of contract.
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